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ABSTRACT 
 
The End of the Disinterested Profession: American Public Accountancy  
1927-1962. (August 2009) 
Michael E. Doron, B.A., Miami University; 
M.Acc., Case Western Reserve University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Harold Livesay 
 
 
This study traces the development of the American public accounting profession 
from 1927 to 1962.  Over the course of these thirty-five years, accounting evolved from 
an insular, divided group whose professional competence and independence was 
doubted, even by its own members, to one that spoke with one united national voice, 
proudly asserted its ability to take on additional responsibilities, and had cemented an 
essential place in the American economy. The study makes use of archival sources, 
included large portions of the papers of George O. May, the doyen of the old Wall Street 
elite whose correspondence into the 1950’s reflects the profession’s development, and 
provides the first study of the accounting profession’s response to the union corruption 
scandals.  I look at the major events that caused this evolution, including the writings of 
William Z. Ripley, the New Deal and the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the McKesson-Robbins scandal, the Second World War, the postwar 
economic expansion, and the union corruption scandals. I show how these events forced 
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the profession to accept the responsibilities American society demanded of it, and how 
the leadership of the profession passed from a Wall Street-centered elite that styled itself 
after a British ideal of the professional as a disinterested, independent gentleman who 
did not promote himself and whose integrity and expertise did not require rigid rules of 
conduct, to a new generation that embraced a more modern ideal of the professional, one 
who followed strict rules of conduct and educational requirements, and who embraced a 
broader vision of public accountancy’s responsibilities to American society, as 
evidenced by the prominent public role the American Institute of CPA’s took when 
Congress looked to impose stricter regulations on trade unions and pensions in the wake 
of the union corruption scandals of the late 1950’s.   Finally, I evaluate the consequences 
of this evolution, consequences that I believe persisted into the twenty-first century with 
the debate over non-audit services in the wake of the Enron scandal.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a case study of a profession, American public accountancy.  
Specifically, I focus on the auditors of corporate financial statements.  Certified Public 
Accountants prepare tax returns, serve as consultants to business, and work as 
managerial accountants within corporations themselves.  But the flagship service of the 
profession is the audit report of a company’s financial statements issued by an 
independent CPA (i.e. hired by the company to perform the legally required function of 
a financial statement audit).  The report is an official seal of approval of the company’s 
publicly disclosed financial information.  The auditor states that “in our opinion, the 
financial statements…present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial 
position” of the corporation.  This certification provides assurance that parties outside 
the corporation, particularly creditors, shareholders, and potential investors, can use the 
financial statements to evaluate the company’s financial health.  If investors do not trust 
the accuracy of the financial statements, they will be reluctant to invest, and the capital 
markets that fund American business may grind to a halt.    
I focus on the crucial years of 1927-62, when accountants evolved from an 
insular, divided group with an uncertain mandate from American society for its services 
to a profession eager to promote itself and to expand its reach and responsibilities.  From 
the beginning of the push to reform America’s capital markets with William Z. Ripley’s  
__________                                                                                                                                    
This dissertation follows the style of Accounting History.  
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1927 polemic Main Street and Wall Street, up to the 1939 McKesson-Robbins audit 
scandal, the leadership of the profession shied away from reformers’ entreaties that 
accountants raise their public profile and their independence from corporate clients.  But 
in the wake of McKesson-Robbins, and the democratization caused by a geometric 
expansion in the profession’s ranks, a new generation of leaders began to take a more 
expansive view of the profession’s proper role.  Faced with pressure from regulators and 
from competing professions, they were forced to act, defensively, to maintain their status 
as a profession.  As I will describe, the American market for professional services forced 
CPA’s to raise their professional standards, engage in public relations to educate the 
public about their contribution to financial stewardship, accept increased responsibilities 
and legal liabilities by expanding the audit franchise to pensions and labor unions, and 
finally to actively promote the CPA’s skills as a business consultant in testimony before 
Congress in 1962.   
The two decades after McKesson-Robbins and including World War II and the 
postwar economic expansion were a critical time in accounting’s history, when 
thousands of new CPA’s shifted the focus of public accounting’s national leadership, 
embodied in the American Institute of Accountants (later the AICPA), away from the 
large accounting firms and towards the needs of the small practitioner.  In doing so, the 
profession consolidated the power needed to protect its exclusive right to conduct 
financial statement audits.  It also adopted a more aggressive and self-interested stance 
in its agenda, eagerly seeking out new venues, and new revenue, for the CPA’s skills.  
This had both beneficial consequences, by forcing the AICPA to take responsibility for 
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the standards of all practicing accountants and to embrace an ethic of public service, and 
ominous ones, by nudging CPA’s into the high-margin, high-risk field of consulting.  
My goal in this dissertation is to both describe this evolution and evaluate its 
consequences for public accounting in America, consequences that I believe are still 
being felt today. 
Sriram and Vollmers (1997) divide the study of American public accountancy 
into two models: Functionalist and Conflict.  In the Functionalist model, “The primary 
assumption…is that the profession is devoted to the public interest, to human welfare.” 
The Conflict model, by contrast, “assumes that self interest is the dominant motivation 
of a profession” (Sriram and Vollmers, 1997, p.3). The Functionalist model has been 
largely limited to official histories and memoirs.  The Conflict model is much more 
descriptive of scholarly work on public accountancy and on professions in the United 
States in general.  Seemingly every historian who has evaluated American public 
accountancy has been critical of the profession’s reluctance to increase its standards of 
professionalism and to accept the responsibilities society demanded of it.  David 
Hawkins wrote that prior to the reforms of the New Deal, “the influence of the…public 
accounting profession was severely curtailed by the unwillingness of much of their 
membership to act independently of management” (Hawkins, 1963,  p.149.  See also 
McCraw, 1984, pp.189-90, Miranti, 1990, p.153, Sriram and Vollmers, 1997, p.6, and 
Previts and Merino, 1998,  pp.293, 318).  But I believe that to some extent their 
judgments are premature because they focus only on the 1930s, often ending with a 
cursory summary of the McKesson-Robbins scandal of 1939 (Sriram and Vollmers, 
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1997, Miranti, 1990).  Sufficient attention has not been given to the aftermath of 
McKesson-Robbins, and the changes in the profession’s leadership that it began.   
The American Institute of Accountants, composed largely of Wall Street-
centered CPA’s, and modeling themselves after a nineteenth century British ideal of 
professionals as disinterested gentlemen serving a select clientele, had seen their grip on 
the profession weakened by the 1929 stock market crash and the new regime of 
regulation and legal liability imposed by the New Deal’s Securities Acts.  This self-
styled elite was forced to merge with their chief rival, the American Society of Certified 
Public Accountants, in 1937 as a counterweight to the stricter oversight being imposed 
by the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission.   The McKesson-Robbins 
scandal, which publicly revealed the inadequacy of accountants’ professional standards, 
undermined the elite’s claim to leadership.  Over the next two decades, a vast expansion 
of the profession’s numbers, spurred by a demand for more trained accountants to 
replace the use of temporary workers identified as a major cause of the McKesson-
Robbins scandal, by the domestic labor shortage during World War II, and by the 
postwar economic expansion, brought new leaders to a unified AIA, mindful of the 
power of public relations and responsive to the needs of the small practitioner CPAs who 
made up an increasing and increasingly dominant majority of the profession.   
The methodology of archival history is storytelling, the goal being to provide 
insight into phenomena through detailed if unscientific reconstruction of the event’s 
origins and development.  It can form the basis for testable hypotheses and convey the 
ambiguity of human motivations that more formal research methods often miss.  
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Statistical research, while more conducive to identifying patterns and forming 
generalizable conclusions, is limited to questions that can be “operationalized”, or 
properly abstracted from real life to discrete relationships.  A particularly relevant 
example is the journalist Kurt Eichenwald’s study of the Enron debacle, Conspiracy of 
Fools (2005).  Accounting research prior to Enron was unable to find support for the 
seemingly obvious hypothesis that accounting firms’ integrity was compromised when 
they did consulting work for clients they also audited (Kinney, et al, 2004, p.563).  
Eichenwald’s recreation of events, done through interviews with the participants and an 
exhaustive study of documents, provides incontrovertible evidence that such a conflict 
did exist in Arthur Andersen’s dealings with Enron, and insinuates that it must have 
occurred elsewhere. 
In this chapter, I will first define professions as they exist in the United States.  I 
will next review the relevant literature and place my thesis in the context of these works.   
With this foundation, I can outline the role public accounting plays in American society 
and expand on my thesis that the market for accounting’s services successfully molded 
the profession to fill this role.  Finally, I will compare the story of accounting’s 
professionalization with that of other American professions and professions in Europe.  
 A profession can be defined as an occupation that requires licensing from the 
state.  A few basic characteristics of professions in the United States and England can 
also be asserted with little controversy:  a profession has some sort of expert knowledge, 
is largely self-policing, controls its own membership, and works under some form of 
social accountability.  In the United States as well as England, this social accountability 
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is achieved chiefly through legal liability.  For accounting, medicine, the law and other 
licensed professions, the right to be sued for professional mistakes is the chief method of 
control society retains over otherwise self-governing professions.  Discipline of 
members is controlled by the professions themselves, through such methods as censure, 
suspension, or in rare cases expulsion from professional ranks.  In his study of 
management consulting, The World’s Newest Profession (2006), Christopher McKenna 
writes that the refusal to accept standards of legal liability marks management 
consultants as something less than true professionals. 
But this does not answer the question of what role society asks professions to 
play.  Most writers will usually characterize professions as vaguely serving some higher 
calling.  As Nathaniel Hatch summarized the professional ideal:  “The professional 
person, it has been said, does not work in order to be paid but is paid in order to work” 
(Hatch, 1988, p.2).  Viewing this somewhat more cynically, Andrew Abbott compared 
the position of professions in England and the United States with that in Europe: 
“General social obligations are more formal among continental professions than among 
Anglo-American ones.  The relative power of continental governments has allowed them 
to place and enforce such obligations on the professions; in America these obligations 
are merely paraded in the preambles to codes of professional ethics” (Abbott, 1988, 
p.60).  This outlook can be traced to the sociologist Talcott Parsons, who wrote that we 
ostensibly ask professions to serve society, but in practice they exist largely to serve 
themselves (Parsons, 1939, p.458, Schleef, 2006, p.5).  Parsons saw something 
resembling market forces working to define and enforce professions’ role in American 
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life.  Professions exist in the same market economy as business, and are inexorably 
drawn into this dynamic.  This description owes much to Abbott’s model of jurisdiction, 
from his book The System of Professions (1988).   For Abbott, professions exist in a dog-
eat-dog world where they fight with each other for professional space, or jurisdiction.  
He argues that this model fits the actual pattern of professional work much better than 
traditional studies: “Most authors study professions one at a time.  Most assume that 
professions grow through a series of stages called professionalization” (Abbott, 1988, 
p.1).  As Abbott describes, it is interprofessional competition, not a profession’s 
development in isolation from other professions, which defines it.   In order to carve out 
their space, a profession must define its expert knowledge and then convince both 
government and the public at large that this knowledge is both useful and exclusively 
theirs.                                                         
          I have found this concept particularly useful in describing the process that shaped 
accounting in the United States.  Once a profession gains a viable jurisdiction, its raison 
d’etre is to retain this professional space.  It was to maintain its jurisdiction that accounting 
took on new responsibilities in the years 1927-62.  Threatened by the SEC with losing the 
right to set accounting standards in the 1930s, accounting’s two rival national associations 
merged in 1937 to take all CPAs under one umbrella and speak with one voice to protect 
their space.  Threatened again by the McKesson-Robbins scandal and beset by a mass of 
new CPAs as the labor shortages of World War II and the postwar expansion threatened 
to overwhelm the old guard leadership, the profession shifted its focus to the needs of 
the small practitioner and took responsibility for the work and standards of these new 
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members.  And threatened during the union corruption scandals with losing their 
exclusive franchise to conduct financial statement audits to unlicensed public 
accountants, the profession was ready to offer its expertise to aid American society by 
helping to bring financial order to unions and pensions.  By 1962 the concerns about 
self-promotion and taking on new responsibilities and legal liability had been cast aside, 
as the president of the AICPA proudly testified before Congress of the CPA’s expertise 
as a man of business.  The old-guard leadership of the accounting profession, proud of 
its hard-won place auditing America’s big businesses, resisted all these steps out of fear 
that the pedestrian work of small practitioners and the suspect financial propriety of 
unsophisticated entities like labor unions threatened their image of the profession, an 
image rooted in the nineteenth century that was incongruous with the American 
economy of the mid-twentieth century. 
As I describe in Chapter V, I use the term “disinterested” in the title to suggest 
the tension within the profession as to how accountants understood their role in the 
American economy.  Prior to the late 19th century, professions were generally class-
based.  The wealthiest clients were served by a small coterie of men who had been 
trained through some sort of apprenticeship system.   These individuals could rely on a 
financially secure career by serving their exclusive clientele, providing they followed a 
gentleman’s code.  Such a code disdained soliciting clients, advertising or any form of 
self-promotion, or competition with other professionals (Wiener, 1981, p.14-16, 
Bledstein, 1978, p.192).   This was the ethic that the original leaders of the American 
accounting profession, many of them transplanted British accountants, inherited.  But for 
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the modern professional, working in a world where money speaks much more 
powerfully than class, the disinterested model can seem naïve and antiquated.  The state 
enforces professional monopolies over work through licensing and education 
requirements, and a profession that cannot justify itself can find its jurisdiction 
threatened. 
Before the New Deal, the certified public accountant played an uncertain role in 
the American economy.  In the 1920s, large, publicly traded companies increasingly 
obtained annual financial statement audits, but the audience for these audits was 
generally limited to creditors (mostly banks).  These were sophisticated financial 
statement readers with both the expertise to parse the statements and the access to 
management to request additional inside information.  Audits as yet were not designed to 
serve the small equity investor, who businesses increasingly turned to for funding  
(Previts and Merino, 1998, p.249).  It would be the writings of William Z. Ripley, first in 
a series of articles in Atlantic Monthly and then in his 1927 book, Main Street and Wall 
Street, that first looked to the accounting profession to serve the financially 
unsophisticated small investor.  The New Dealers, in writing the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934, adopted this viewpoint.  They understood that the small shareholder lacked the 
time and expertise necessary to effectively monitor management (Draft of article 
prepared for Sam Rayburn, Landis Papers 9-2).   It would take “financial gatekeepers”, 
including lawyers and public accountants, to fulfill the role of watchdog in the American 
system of corporate governance.  While Boards of Directors ostensibly exist to serve as 
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shareholders’ representative within the corporation, “All Boards of Directors are 
prisoners of their gatekeepers” (Coffee, 2006, p.1). 
American exceptionalism, or the emphasis of historians on what is unique in the 
American experience, is nowhere demonstrated more clearly than in the American 
system of corporate governance.  “Unlike any other nation state in the modern world, the 
very idea of government power is stigmatized in the U.S.” (Ellis, 1997, p.296). The anti-
statist ethos that characterizes Americans’ relationship with their government meant that 
there were few checks on American big business as it evolved in the late nineteenth 
century.  An ad-hoc system of government regulation began with the ICC regulation of 
the railroads and continued into the Progressive era.  The Blue Sky Laws, the uneven 
and largely ineffective state regulations of securities issues, were typical of America’s 
approach to monitoring business in the years before the New Deal.  But more crucial, as 
Mark Roe describes, was Americans’ fear of power concentrating in the hands of 
financial titans.  This made the development of large financial intermediaries who could 
serve as effective monitors of corporate management impossible in the United States: 
“American law and politics deliberately diminished the power of financial institutions in 
general...American politics repeatedly prevented financial intermediaries from becoming 
big enough to take influential big blocks of stock…a process that began as early as the 
nineteenth century with the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States.  
Thereafter, each state created its own separate banking system, making the U.S. banking 
system the most unusual in the developed world” (Roe, 1994, pp. 6, 21).    
 In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression, the 
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New Deal codified limits on financial intermediaries’ power, by separating commercial 
and investment banking with the Glass-Steagal Act.  In place of large financial 
intermediaries to monitor big business, the New Deal created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to protect the interests of the millions of small investors who 
would fund American big business.  But the SEC has generally lacked the staff and the 
expertise to fulfill this mandate effectively, and so America came to rely on financial 
gatekeepers, including accountants, lawyers, and the press, to look over the shoulders of 
American big business (Seliman, 1982,  pp. 197-201; Chatov, 1975,  p.178).  
 It did not have to be this way.  The United States could have developed its capital 
markets along the model of the European Continent.  In an influential study, Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000) divide developed economies into “common law” and “code 
law” countries.  They label countries where stakeholders lack access to insider 
information, and thus depend on credible public disclosures, as common law countries.  
In BKR’s sample, these include the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia. Countries where capital market investment is more concentrated through 
institutions such as banks are labeled code law countries.  In their sample these include 
France, Germany, and Japan.   BKR hypothesize that in common law nations, public 
disclosure through financial statements is a vital corporate governance mechanism. In 
code law countries, the job of monitoring management is done by large stakeholders 
such as banks, other financial institutions, labor unions, government, suppliers and 
customers.  These groups have close relationships with firms and access to insider 
information.  In code law countries, as BKR write, “there is no presumption that parties 
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operate at a distance”, and so communication devices such as financial statements are 
less important (Ball et al., 2000, p.15).  But in common-law countries, only management 
is privy to inside information, and so credible disclosure becomes the primary means of 
corporate communication with investors.  This is the system the New Dealers put in 
place, with the preparation of transparent, reliable financial statements serving as a 
cornerstone of the effective functioning of capital markets.  
But the American accounting profession proved reluctant to accept this role.   
Two rival national organizations represented accountants when the Securities Acts were 
implemented, neither of them with a clear agenda.  They did not possess clear control 
over membership into the profession and they lacked standards for legal liability.  When 
William Z. Ripley put accountants in the public spotlight with Main Street and Wall 
Street in1927, his chief criticism was that accountants lacked the independence from 
their corporate clients that would make them effective watchdogs.  James Landis, chief 
author of the Securities Acts and later Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, saw developing accountants’ professionalism as one of the SEC’s most 
pressing challenges.  For the most part, as we will see, accountants feared the risks of 
legal liability that would come from greater responsibility.  It would take a generation, 
and a geometric increase in the profession’s numbers, for public accountancy to achieve 
the standards Ripley and Landis envisioned for it.     
American law and medicine endured similar growing pains.  The American 
Revolution left the legal profession’s numbers in the new nation depleted as loyalists 
fled the new nation, and what had been an elite profession in the colonial era became 
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more egalitarian through the Jacksonian era that “witnessed the general disestablishment 
and humbling of the professions in America” (Numbers, 1988, p.52).  For most of the 
nineteenth century, American law remained divided into a class-like structure, with the 
profession’s elite distancing themselves from the vast majority of the profession.   
 The Progressive Era has been labeled the Guilded Age for the growth and 
consolidation of professions that took place in these years.  The dizzying array of 
changes that the United States witnessed in the late nineteenth century, from the 
expansion of railroads and proliferation of communications technology to the emergence 
of big business and teeming urban slums brought about fundamental changes in 
American society.  A new middle class order centered in the city replaced the small town 
ethos that had defined American life.  This order imbibed the lessons of science and 
sought organized, bureaucratic control.  “Men were now separated more by skill and 
occupation than by community” (Wiebe, 1967, p.xiv).   
 This mentality was obviously a boon to American professions.   Like 
accounting, the law’s elite practitioners had disdained expansive written ethics codes, 
preferring to leave these decisions to the lawyer’s professional judgment.  But over the 
course of the nineteenth century, the expansion of the number of practicing lawyers 
forced the profession to take more aggressive actions to defend their jurisdiction.  They 
took steps to limit membership, particularly by organizing accredited law schools that 
taught a standardized curriculum, and worked to prevent title companies from 
performing legal work  (Bloomfield, 1988, p.41).   
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In another parallel with the experience of accountants, the legal profession was 
hindered by divisions along class and ethnic lines.  The profession’s leadership consisted 
of white, Anglo-Saxon men, and these men were determined to keep it that way.  But as 
African-American, women, and Jewish lawyers began to organize societies and compete 
for work, the legal profession was forced to take steps to unify the profession under one 
banner  (Bloomfield, p.41).   
One striking difference between the development of the American accounting 
and legal professions is the more broad-minded mentality of legal education in the 
United States.  Beginning in the 1920s and New Deal years, a movement began in law 
school curricula to explicitly educate lawyers in the social implications and 
responsibilities of their work.  The idealistic view of government’s power to defend the 
rights of labor and minorities spurred a generation of law school students to take a more 
expansive view of their profession’s role in American society.  This tradition continues 
today in “the New Professionalism of today’s public interest lawyers, consumer 
advocates, and poverty lawyers” (Bloomfield, 1988, p.46).   
Accounting education, at least in the United States, consistently spurned this role 
and has arguably become even more focused today on educating accountants as financial 
technicians.  Since the advent of positive economics in the 1950s, a movement begun 
with the work of Milton Friedman, normative research in accounting has been 
discouraged by the leading journals and universities.  Lipartito and Miranti (1998) note: 
“Still others have noted how regnant methodologies and research paradigms have 
stultified the development of scholarly interest in the social dimensions of accounting” 
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(p.303).  Notably, this is not true of accounting research abroad, where fields such as 
accounting history flourish.   
The history of the American medical profession is also instructive.  The 
Jacksonian era’s distrust of institutions and privilege damaged doctors’ reputations as 
well, but medicine further suffered from the fact that in this era practices such as 
bleeding patients made doctors of dubious utility.  In this atmosphere, rival professions 
such as homeopaths proliferated.  The American Medical Association was founded in 
1847 as an organization of elite, upper-class practitioners that, like accounting’s elite in 
the 1920s, disdained advertising and the vast majority of practitioners of all stripes.  But 
rival groups flourished, and in the mid-nineteenth century most of the laws restricting 
the practice of medicine were repealed.  The AMA continued to fight to retain some 
jurisdiction, battling nurses and pharmacists to hold on to an exclusive right to practice 
medicine  (Numbers, 1988, p.60).  Again they found strength in numbers, when in 1903 
the AMA “took additional steps toward unity by…welcoming as members eclectics and 
homeopaths willing to forsake sectarian dogma for scientific truth (Numbers, 1988, 
p.63).”   But as scientific advances broadened the field of medicine, doctors found that 
there were limits to medicine’s ability to obtain an exclusive franchise.  Instead, they 
conceded territory to psychology, optometry, dentistry, and a host of other specialties.  
This is somewhat like the truce accountants and securities lawyers reached to divide 
financial gatekeeper functions, or the never-ending battle between tax accountants and 
lawyers over that lucrative field.   
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What follows are four narrative chapters describing the evolution of the 
American accounting profession, followed by my conclusions.  I hope to demonstrate 
how and why financial accounting and auditing became an essential cog in the 
functioning of American capital markets.  Chapter II begins with the earliest roots of 
accounting and the development of public accountancy, tracing the British origins of the 
American profession and the profession’s development in the United States up to 1927.  
Chapter III involves the crucial years of the stock market crash and the New Deal, with 
particular attention to the Securities Acts that created the paradigm for the modern 
accounting profession.  Chapter IV describes the first decade of the SEC regime, and 
how the leadership and goals of the national organization of CPAs, the American 
Institute of Accountants, passed to a new generation eager to prove the accountant’s 
utility to the American economy and society.  Finally, Chapter V looks at the union 
corruption scandals and the AIA’s (by this time renamed the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants) response.  This episode, and the AICPA’s new public 
relations efforts that began in these years, demonstrate how dramatically the profession’s 
image of itself had changed from 1927.  
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CHAPTER II 
ACCOUNTANCY TO 1927 
This chapter will look at the evolution of accounting and auditing up to the era 
that my dissertation covers.  This will set the stage for the rest of my study by describing 
where the profession stood in 1927.  But I hope also to suggest the uncertain role public 
accountancy plays in a market economy.  Capital markets evolved in the United States 
without broad requirements that the financial statements of publicly traded corporations 
be audited.  The American profession has carved out its jurisdiction without ever 
offering clear evidence that the American economy benefits from its service.   
I. Accounting Before the Industrial Revolution 
Some form of systematic record keeping of financial transactions no doubt 
emerged as soon as society developed the concepts of money and writing. Even the most 
rudimentary business requires documentation of exchanges.  The first exposition of 
double-entry bookkeeping is generally credited to Luca Pacioli in Venice in 1494, in 
Summa de Aritmetica.  Most likely Pacioli did not invent double-entry himself, but 
historians have sufficiently traced the popularity of Summa to credit Pacioli as the father 
of accounting.  Both Max Weber and Werner Sombart, writing in the early twentieth 
century, expounded on the importance of double-entry, Sombart writing: “Capitalism, 
without double-entry bookkeeping is simply inconceivable” (Sombart, Der Moderne 
Kapitalismus, 1919, quoted in Davidson and Anderson, 1987, p.112).  The need for 
double-entry itself may be debatable, but Sombart’s point was that a commercial 
economy cannot function without some means of recording that identifies profit and 
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loss.  Double-entry allows the proprietor of some good or service to track both the 
source and the use of his capital.  When he loans out money, he can record that he is 
owed this money back and that he no longer has the cash available for his own use.  
When he purchases goods needed to run his business, he knows that he has replaced one 
asset (cash) for another (the goods he bought).  It is no coincidence that Pacioli’s work 
emerged from one of the first commercial societies, the merchant economy of the Italian 
city-states.   
This ability to follow the flow of money through the business is an essential part 
of stewardship of funds, the fundamental element of investment.   Investment requires 
trust; passive investment, where the investor takes no active part in the business, doubly 
so.  That is why merchants prior to the nineteenth century tended to rely on family 
members, often setting up their sons and brothers in key ports.  But without these 
personal connections, an investor will generally require some formal means of ensuring 
that his money is well spent.  The Italian merchant of Pacioli’s time made his living by 
funding overseas voyages to obtain raw materials or handcrafts that could then be sold in 
Europe.  The money for these expeditions was obtained from other merchants or wealthy 
individuals.  It was to keep track of these investments and the resultant profits that 
accounting developed.  As Littleton writes: “Bookkeeping arose as the direct result of 
the establishment of partnerships on a large scale” (Littleton, 1933, p.9). 
Accounting through the sixteenth century remained rudimentary, as did the 
nature of business.  Goods were generally bought and sold with little value-added 
manufacturing taking place.  Most partnerships were organized for a single voyage.  The 
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partnership would then be liquidated, returning the capital and distributing the profits to 
the partners.  Sophisticated bookkeeping was unnecessary for such ventures.  In fact, a 
single-entry system that simply tallied each partner’s investment and then distributed 
profits in proportion to the investment would likely have sufficed. 
Some concept of auditing seems to be as old as bookkeeping itself.  References 
exist from the Middle Ages of inspection being conducted of the books of town 
treasurers and chamberlains.  Usually this was done by some other government official, 
although scattered evidence exists of professional auditors.  A tombstone in 
Buckinghamshire, England reads: “Here lyeth part of Richard Bowle, who faithfully 
served diverse great lords as auditor on earth, but also prepared himself to give up his 
account to the Lord in heaven…He died on 16th December 1626, and of his age, 77” 
(Littleton, 1933, p.261). 
Beginning in the early seventeenth century and continuing for about 200 years, 
most of the innovations in accounting occurred in Britain, as British overseas exploration 
and trade expanded and the British economy began an era of remarkable growth.  
Separated from the rest of Europe by the English Channel, the British economy was able 
to develop without the crippling costs of constant war that burdened its Continental 
neighbors.  With a much smaller aristocracy than the rest of Europe, England’s middling 
classes were far larger, making for a much broader consumer market that further fueled 
economic growth. 
  The scale of the British merchant’s business expanded as the English economy 
grew.  From 1600-1620, about 40 trading companies were founded in England with 
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approximately 10,000 investors (Harris, 2000, p.45).   As overseas trade became more 
reliably profitable, more investors were needed, and sophisticated bookkeeping was in 
greater demand.  As accounting practice developed sufficiently to satisfy investors’ 
demands for careful stewardship of their funds, investors became increasingly willing to 
leave their investment in the business for the long term, no longer demanding that profits 
be divided at the end of every voyage.  Overseas trade was increasingly dominated by 
going concerns, a business that runs for the foreseeable future with no plans to shut 
down.  These businesses also functioned under unlimited liability, where the partners 
were expected to make additional investments as needed (Baskin, 1988,  p.201). 
Keeping track of each partner’s investment and profits became an increasingly complex 
affair.  This work was generally done by the managing partners, who had been trained by 
apprenticeship or by reading one of the many primers on double-entry that had cropped 
up in the years since Pacioli.  
 Jonathan Baskin has described the historical evolution of investment as a 
process of developing tools to overcome what economists call asymmetric information, 
when one individual (the insider who runs the business) has more information than the 
passive investor.  “Asymmetric information…appears always to have limited the scope 
and use of financial markets; the practices and institutions observable today represent 
solutions that have evolved to overcome these limitations…Only as public accounting 
data improved and as other signaling mechanisms evolved could security markets 
gradually progress from personal to arm’s lengths transactions” (Baskin, 1988, pp. 200-
1).   As we will see, the need for proper accounting and auditing methodology has 
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throughout modern history been one of the pillars in developing markets for investment.  
As the sophistication of business and investment expanded from the rise of Britain’s 
fiscal-military state through the Industrial Revolution, the practice of accounting evolved 
to the point where a profession of trained practitioners could find a place in the market 
economy. 
II. The British Fiscal-Military State 
 The emergence of parliamentary government in Britain was crucial to the 
development of the accounting profession. British society evolved with a healthy 
skepticism of governmental authority, a tradition that distinguishes it from its European 
neighbors and that their American cousins would inherit.  It was in this atmosphere that 
accounting came to be a crucial element of checks and balances on executive authority, 
in both public and private spheres of power.   
This tradition emerged uniquely in England, for reasons historians continue to 
debate.  Most popular is the “England is an island” thesis, that Britain’s separation from 
Continental Europe left it less burdened by the costs of constant war than its neighbors, 
and delayed the development of a fiscal-military state that accrued power in a strong 
King.  By the time England did develop into a military power, in response to France’s 
Louis XIV in the late 17th century, a strong Parliament that zealously worked to limit 
royal power was already firmly entrenched. 
Laurence Stone, in Causes of the English Revolution (1972), identifies Henry 
VIII’s break with the Roman Catholic Church in 1534 as the seminal event in this 
evolution.  Without the legitimacy the Church had provided to the English throne, Henry 
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and his successors were forced to accept increased parliamentary authority.  His 
subsequent decision to sell off the extensive Church land holdings left the English 
Crown without a key source of revenue, forcing it to regularly go hat in hand to 
Parliament.  These tensions were exacerbated by the high-handed rule of Charles I that 
culminated in the English Civil War (1642-51).  With the restoration of the monarchy 
after Cromwell’s dictatorship, an uneasy truce with King James II began.  But suspicious 
of James’ Catholic allegiances, members of Parliament conspired to oust James and 
install the Protestant William of Orange, who wished to enlist England alongside his 
native Dutch Republic in the struggle against Louis XIV.  But in return for their support, 
Parliament demanded a substantive role in policy-making.  A century and a half of 
struggle with the monarchy had left the English gentry with an independence and taste 
for power that profoundly shaped English politics.  As John Brewer writes: “The 
presence after 1688 of a standing House of Commons eager to root out malfeasance and 
reluctant to disburse monies without good reason created a degree of public 
accountability that acted as a powerful constraint on administrative practice” (Brewer, 
1988, p.70). 
A strong national government with adequate funding was needed to enter the fray 
against Louis XIV.  The rise of a fiscal-military state in England meant the rise of a 
political structure far more accountable to taxpayers (mostly the wealthy elite) than any 
of its European counterparts.  As John Brewer writes: “The timing of the emergence of 
the English fiscal-military state is crucial. When its mobilization occurred, it happened 
under the auspices of a regime which exploited the techniques of Dutch finance” 
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(Brewer, 1988,  p.24).   These techniques included the creation of the Bank of England 
in 1694.  Among the financial innovations of this era was the use of fractional reserves 
by banks (where only a percentage of the depositor’s money is kept in the bank’s vault, 
the rest being made available to loan out at interest, allowing the effective supply of 
money to exceed the actual amount of specie in circulation), but even more important 
was the creation of a broad investor class of wealthy individuals placing funds in the 
bank.  The funds of the Bank of England and rival ventures like the notorious South Sea 
Company (whose stock collapsed in 1720) were used to fund the English military.  The 
gentry of England now had a direct financial stake in how their government was run, and 
with the power of a standing Parliament, they increasingly demanded reliable 
information. 
The actual practice of public accountability evolved slowly over the course of the 
18th century.   It was at this time (1693) that Parliament began guaranteeing government 
debt.  Prior to the Glorious Revolution, the King borrowed on his personal responsibility 
alone. Britain developed a modern stock market after 1688 that facilitated broad 
investment by the public in government bonds and the East India Company.  Reliable 
payments of interest on the bonds encouraged a public confidence in these investments 
that nations on the Continent could not achieve.  With this credibility, England’s fiscal-
military state largely avoided the corruption that plagued France.  Devastating as the 
stock market collapse that accompanied the South Sea Bubble of 1720 was, it did not 
damage the fundamental confidence of Britons in either their government or the private-
public institutions (the Bank of England, the East India Company, and the South Sea 
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Company, which somehow survived the collapse of its stock) that remained its largest 
creditors.     
The accountability of the British government in this era was perhaps best 
demonstrated by the immediate reaction to the South Sea Bubble.  Richard Dale writes: 
“The subsequent crisis management did much to redeem Parliament’s reputation” 
(Richard Dale, 2004, p.148).  Sir Robert Walpole used the collapse to gain ascendancy 
in the Cabinet over his Tory rivals.  But regardless of his motives, his actions in the 
wake of the Bubble were of incalculable value to the endurance of the fiscal military 
state.  As a biographer wrote in 1800: “Walpole now possessed the power, had he 
possessed the inclination, to ruin the South Sea company, the directors of which had 
treated him with many marks of contempt and obloquy” ( Coxe, William, 1800, p.239).  
But instead the plan that he and others implemented, which would become the 1721 Act 
to Restore the Public Credit, preserved the Company and with it the financial edifice of 
the state.  Seven million pounds owed to the government by the South Sea Company was 
forgiven, and investors who had made down payments on South Sea stock were 
permitted not to pay the balance.  This was “an unprecedented intervention by the state” 
(Dale, 2004, p.147).  A subsequent investigation by Parliament publicly exposed the 
fraud and widespread bribery involved in promoting the South Sea scheme, and several 
directors of the Company had their estates forfeited; one spent time in the Tower of 
London (Dale, 2004, p.150).    
There is a basis for concluding that the Act to Restore the Public Credit was 
motivated by genuine sympathy for the thousands who had lost their savings as well as 
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an understanding of the importance of public confidence in the government and in 
British capital markets.  Although this did inaugurate the notorious era of government 
corruption known as the robinocracy, Britain showed a sense of public accountability 
that stands in sharp contrast to their European rivals. 
In addition to capital markets considered remarkably transparent for their time, a 
large and professional tax collecting bureaucracy also evolved in Britain in this era.  
These agents were generally trained in basic bookkeeping and statistics, and developed 
the art of paper trails for government funds.  “Controversy over any tax measure of the 
British Parliament was invariably accompanied by the presentation of accounts, reports 
and papers in the lower house” (Brewer, 1989, p.130). 
These practices took on greater significance in the late 18th century.  The East 
India Company took over the province of Bengal in 1763, and soon had an army of 
200,000 soldiers defending it.  The stock of this semi-public institution was held by an 
ever-expanding investor class in Britain, and drew increasing attention from Parliament.  
In addition, the American Revolution, the first war the British Empire lost, was a cause 
of much soul-searching.  A debate over the power wielded by British government led to 
“a growing appetite for data and information” supplied not only to Parliament but to 
newspapers and special-interest groups lobbying for government funds and favor  
(Brewer, 1989, p.221).  The formal reports prepared by the bureaucracy had to be 
accessible to laymen, as the British citizenry developed an expectation that their 
government belonged to them.   
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Private investment also flourished in these years.  Britons witnessed a 
transportation revolution in the late 18th century, and an expanding canal network also 
saw a flood of new investment, with canals often funded by hundreds of limited partners 
(Harris, 2000, pp.100,142).   
But the art of accounting remained fairly static before the Industrial Revolution.  
Most of these businesses were family firms or partnerships, and there was still limited 
value-added manufacturing that required sophisticated cost-tracking.   Even the vast 
government and public-private companies involved little more than record-keeping of 
investment and loans.  While the principles of stewardship and transparency evolved 
from the 18th century, it would take the emergence of large-scale industrial enterprises to 
motivate innovations in accountancy.   
III. Financial Reporting in the Industrial Revolution 
In both England and the United States, canals were the largest and most complex 
enterprises before the age of factories and railroads.  England’s canal boom occurred in 
the mid to late 18th century.  America, with its vast natural resources, was generally 
about a generation behind the British in industrial development, and its first major canal 
project was the Erie Canal, opened to traffic in 1823.  It is therefore instructive to look in 
more detail at the canal builders’ use of financial reporting and capital markets.   
We have seen that England achieved a broad investor class through its major 
public-private corporations, the Bank of England, the South Sea Company, and the East 
India Company.   But these entities were backed and overseen by the British 
government.  Canals in England were generally private investments, and in the United 
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States the young government was only just beginning to establish itself as creditworthy.  
Enticing large groups of passive investors was an uphill battle.  For this reason, “until 
the 1840s, even in England, canal and railroad securities were sold primarily in local 
markets” (Baskin, 1988, p.211).  Residents of the region where the canal or railroad was 
being built were in a position to judge the project’s feasibility.   Distant investors, in fact, 
would often rely on the depth of locals’ subscription to a stock to evaluate its prospects  
(Chandler, 1956,  p.100).    
The Erie Canal was a project on a scale that dwarfed any other canal in the 
world.  It would link the farms of the Midwest with the port of New York City through a 
300 mile path over upstate New York.   Private capital markets in the U.S. were not up 
to the task of funding this immense project .  As with Britain’s “Big 3” public-private 
companies, only government possessed the resources and credibility to undertake 
projects on this scale. The American federal government also proved reluctant to invest 
in “internal improvements”, and so the job fell to the state of New York.  Hundreds of 
Americans from all walks of life purchased the bonds of the Erie Canal, but there was 
simply not enough capital in the young nation to fund its growth, and so a majority of 
the funding came from overseas investors, mostly British.  To them, the United States 
represented an emerging market akin to China and India today.   British investors in the 
early 19th century were the inheritors of a long tradition of careful stewardship and 
detailed reporting on their investments, and so it was in part to meet these expectations 
that the New York Canal Commissioners annually published detailed statements that are 
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among the earliest examples of financial reporting in the U.S. (Michael, 1996, p.4).    
My own study of these statements forms the basis of the following discussion.   
Characteristically for this era, the New York Canal Commissioners’ statements 
consist mostly of engineering data, not financial statements.   The incredibly detailed and 
sophisticated presentation of engineering issues were unlike anything an investor today 
would expect to see.   Likewise, the financial data suggests a standard of stewardship 
unthinkable from modern management.  Expenditures are often listed by the 
commissioner or superintendent responsible for them, with exact dollar amounts for 
what was spent under each supervisor’s authorization.  In one instance, a three page 
estimate of the cost of building an aqueduct with a wood trunk is followed by a three 
page estimate of the cost of building the same aqueduct of stone.   These were the kinds 
of disclosures that would assuage jittery investors.  As New York Governor Clinton 
wrote: “[Employ] able engineers and skilled contractors, [because, as he maintained, 
only] an undertaking conducted under such auspices will propitiate public opinion and 
secure the confidence of capitalists who are disposed to embark their funds in the 
enterprise” (Miller, 1962, p.92). 
Two insights can be drawn from this emphasis on engineering over finances.   
The first is that a tradition of disclosure and accountability far outpaced the development 
of accounting.   Stewards of other people’s money felt obliged to demonstrate that their 
work was careful and conscientious.  But it did not necessarily follow that sophisticated 
accounting practices were the best means of conveying this.   More logical to the 
corporate managers of this era was to show the tangible results of their projects, rather 
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than the profits accruing to the investors.  This may be seen as a reflection of the attitude 
towards investment in the age before the Robber Barons: the goal of business enterprise 
was the public good, with profits to the investors an ancillary benefit  (Baskin, 1988, 
p.208). 
Second is that a tradition, antiquated though it may have been by this time, 
endured that investors took an active role in the business, and possessed both the time 
and the inclination to make themselves fluent in the field they invested in.  As we have 
seen, increasingly in this era capital markets were expanding to the point where the 
passive investor, who knew little of the business beyond a hope for its profitability, was 
the norm  (Michael, 1996, p.22). 
Even for the simple financial data that does appear, there is a lack of consistency 
in how it is presented.  Different tables are shown in different formats from year to year, 
and amounts are rarely tied to the previous year’s statements.  This is perhaps the 
strongest evidence of the fledgling state of accounting, and suggests that the preparers of 
these reports learned by doing.   Finally, there is little evolution in the sophistication of 
the accounting over time, implying that the New York Canal Commissioners did not 
consider financial data important enough to incorporate best practices or to make 
changes demanded by investors (assuming there were any). 
IV.  The Birth of the Accounting Profession 
In the late 18th century, business enterprise, while expanding tremendously, had 
seen little qualitative change since the Renaissance.   The work of a businessman was 
not much different in England or America in 1800 than in the Italian city-states in 1500.  
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“Business” still consisted largely of the buying and selling of goods, with little value-
added production.  The general merchant purchased and sold whatever goods he could 
acquire wherever he could find a market.   There was little capital investment beyond the 
ships and wagons needed to transport goods.  And so there was little need for 
sophisticated accounting methodology.  Businessmen like Josiah Wedgwood generally 
did not employ trained accountants (of which few existed.)  They often improvised their 
own rudimentary, though detailed, recordkeeping systems  (Jones, 1981, p. 25). 
Two innovations would revolutionize both business and accounting.  
Mechanization made business more complex, and the separation of ownership and 
control transformed how it was financed.   The first was the series of inventions that 
geometrically increased the scale of production.  As T.S. Ashton described it: “A wave 
of gadgets swept over England” (Ashton, 1948, p.3).  Goods that had formerly been 
crafted individually by skilled artisans could now be produced in greater quantities and 
at lower unit costs.   But these machines and the factories to house them required huge 
capital investments.   Such sums could only be raised through numerous investors, most 
of whom had little knowledge of or interest in how the business was run.   New methods 
would be needed to track costs and to steward investors’ money.   
The concept of limited liability had existed for centuries, but only became 
commonplace in the 19th century.   In a partnership, investors were expected to 
contribute additional funds when the business ran short of cash, and were liable for any 
debts the business accumulated (This was generally not as onerous an obligation as it 
might seem, since most businesses in the pre-industrial era carried little debt and were 
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financed almost entirely from partners’ equity).   But for the small scale, passive 
investor, the prospect of unlimited liability was too risky.   The corporate form of 
business offers the limited liability necessary to attract widespread investment, but had 
been outlawed in England since the South Sea Bubble in 1720.   Incorporation could 
only be obtained through act of Parliament, and was rarely granted.   Limited liability 
would only become the common form of business organization in the 19th century.   
Further, unlike overseas voyages to obtain goods or the building of canals, large scale 
industrial enterprises are generally going concerns.   This made it necessary to keep the 
invested capital in the business, with only profits paid out to the owners.  Careful 
accounting that distinguished capital from profit and kept track of each owner’s 
investment became essential for the corporate form to thrive.   
After some 300 static years, accounting rose to meet the challenges of the 
Industrial Era.   The presentation of detailed engineering data was abandoned in favor of 
financial data that allowed the passive shareholder to calculate his profit rather than keep 
careful tabs on the running of the business.  A small shareholder without access to 
management needed to know the number of shares outstanding and the book value of the 
firm in order to assess the value of his investment.   The British Joint Stock Companies 
Act of 1844 mandated that corporations annually publish a balance sheet, making the use 
of accrual accounting essential in order to tabulate the company’s revenues and expenses 
at a point in time, as opposed to cash accounting that necessitated waiting for cash to 
change hands before the outcome of transactions could be determined. 
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The increased use of heavy machinery required new accounting methods to 
allocate costs over time.  It was the railroads that pioneered in this area.  The cost of 
equipment that would benefit the business over the course of decades could not all be 
charged to one year without greatly distorting the presentation of the firm’s profitability.  
Depreciation accounting allows for the equipment to be charged in increments as 
expenses every period throughout its useful life.   
The Industrial Revolution came to Britain about a generation ahead of America, 
and so it is no surprise that the British pioneered in financial reporting practices and that 
Americans largely followed British practice.  With the 1844 Act, Britain finally 
recognized the need for corporate organization of business, ending the practice of a new 
corporation requiring a special act of Parliament.   The 1844 Act further mandated that 
auditors be hired to represent the shareholders’ interests.  From the beginning, it was 
understood as fundamental to the new scale of business that accounting and auditing 
serve to protect shareholders (Littleton, 1933, p.289-93).   
With the increased complexity and demand for accounting services, we begin to 
see the emergence of an accounting profession.  Historians emphasize that the one did 
not necessarily follow the other.  The original intent of the British statutes was that a few 
shareholders would be elected to audit the company’s books, not that trained 
professional auditors would be used.  As John Carey writes: “Economic and social 
change created the need for an accounting profession – but accountants themselves 
created the profession by constantly raising their standards of performance” (Carey, 
1969, p.4).   In 1854, the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh was formed, apparently 
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the first organization of professional accountants (Carey, 1969, p.19).   It was also in 
these years that the first audit firms, including Deloitte and Price Waterhouse, were 
founded (Jones, 1981, p.32).   In the United States, no statutory requirements for 
independent audits were passed until the 20th century, and the American profession 
would be generations behind the British, as we will see. 
According to Littleton, it was the increasing frequency of bankruptcy in the 
boom-and-bust economy of the 19th century that first created the demand for an 
accounting profession in Britain.   Properly valuing the assets of a failed business and 
dividing them up among its creditors demanded an ability to decipher a company’s 
records.  This was work that could have been done by lawyers, but the nascent group of 
accounting professionals in England successfully carved out a jurisdictional space.  It 
was to earn the public’s trust and convince them of the necessity of their expert 
knowledge that the first professional societies and educational requirements for 
accountants emerged in the mid-19th century.  This was often an uphill battle, as the 
statement of one judge in 1875 suggests: “The whole affairs of bankruptcy have been 
handed over to an ignorant set of men called accountants” (Littleton, 1933, p.283).  But 
by the late 19th century, accounting was a recognized profession in Britain and was ready 
to export itself to America.   
V. The Accounting Profession in America 
America’s abundance of national resources and relative scarcity of capital and 
labor meant that it remained an agrarian society through the early 19th century.  This 
began to change with the War of 1812, when the cutoff from British manufactured goods 
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spurred the U.S. to begin developing its own manufacturing base.  Beginning with the 
Erie Canal in 1823 and the expansion of an American railroad network in the 1840s, 
large scale business, largely funded by European (particularly British) investors, spurred 
the growth of American capital markets.  As business became more large-scale and the 
separation of management from ownership became more ubiquitous, formal reporting by 
firms came to replace personal relationships as the basis for establishing trust between 
investors and proprietors.   Over the course of the 19th century, the burgeoning American 
economy became an increasingly popular investment.  It was British investors who first 
sent over professional chartered accountants to shepherd their investments and report on 
the soundness of American business.  From these origins, American accounting would 
develop emulating the British model, centered on professional accountants governed by 
broad statutes, rather than a large government bureaucracy.   
In fact, America’s initial response to the growth of industrial size and power was 
much closer to the model of Continental Europe.  The era of the Robber Barons, when 
big business emerged in the United States leaving a handful of managers with 
unprecedented and largely unchecked power over the American economy, led to 
increasing calls for regulation of business.  As Thomas McCraw describes, “A serious 
institutional lag had opened up between corporate development and the public response 
to it” (McCraw, 1984, p.8).  McCraw explains in Prophets of Regulation how the 
independent regulatory commission served as the Progressive movement’s initial 
response to bringing oversight to the nation’s first big business, the railroads.  With the 
creation of the ICC and its requirement of standardized accounting data by railroads in 
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1886, American public policy was well along a path of government dictating and 
disseminating corporate disclosures.  Paul Miranti concludes: “Public accountancy was 
not a well-known profession to many government leaders; many of them, instead, 
preferred alternative models of economic regulation that depended on the operation of 
strong bureaucratic agencies rather than independent professional groups such as 
accountants” (Miranti, 1990, p.26).   Into the 20th century, accountants in the United 
States had no statutory mandate and no public profile to become the watchdogs of big 
business.   
The creation of a public accounting profession in the United States along the 
British model was largely the work of the transplanted British accountants.  The British 
firm Price Waterhouse opened a New York office in 1890.  The first national 
organization of accountants was the American Association of Public Accountants, 
formed in 1886 by a handful of American and British practitioners.  Their goal was to 
pave the way for their large firms to expand nationally, and so they fought to create 
standardized licensing requirements in the various states.  They were hindered in this 
effort because they did not represent the growing population of local practitioners, who 
obtained their licenses through the states and saw little benefit to a national organization.   
The influence of British practices on the development of the American public 
accounting profession stands in stark contrast to the evolution of cost accounting in 
America.  Because of the size of the American market, American big business, starting 
with the railroads and continuing into the first giant manufacturing enterprises started by 
men like Andrew Carnegie, grew to a scale that dwarfed anything in Britain.  For this 
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reason, along with a cultural stubbornness described by David Landes in Unbound 
Prometheus and Alfred Chandler in Scale and Scope, American managerial techniques 
were far more innovative than their British counterparts.  This included the field of cost 
accounting, which was pioneered, first by engineers and then by trained accountants, in 
the United States and then copied by European firms.   
Miranti emphasizes the cultural cleavages that separated the elite American 
accountants who wished to emulate the British model from the mass of local 
practitioners.  The elite accountants, like much of upper-class America in the late 19th 
century, were anxious about the growing influence of the newer immigrant groups from 
Southern and Eastern Europe.  Following an Anglo-Saxon model in the development of 
an accounting profession would serve to solidify their place in American society.   This 
agenda spread to ideas about the proper training of public accountants.  The British 
model continued to be centered on an apprenticeship system, something the elite hoped 
to transfer to the U.S.  “Apprenticeship was not a practice these [local practitioner] 
members wished to see adopted in America.  Instead, educational institutions accessible 
to all who had ability were more appealing to those whose advancement in the old world 
had been retarded because of humble origins” (Miranti, 1990, p.42). 
The Progressive movement spawned a host of new government regulation of 
business, and created both an opportunity and a challenge to the fledgling American 
accounting profession.  The elite accountants in particular worried that excessive 
government mandate of reporting requirements would reduce accountants to mere 
technicians.  But they were also able to extol the role accounting could play in a society 
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that emphasized scientific methods and technical education as the solution to a system 
many Americans saw as corrupted by an alliance between big business and government.   
Despite some gains by accountants in carving out a space for themselves in the 
American economy, Progressivism’s emphasis on government regulation continued to 
push public accounting more towards a Continental model.  But the sedulous work of the 
transplanted British accountants, along with the basic anti-statist bias that remained 
ingrained in American ideology, reversed this trend and set a course towards an 
independent accounting profession, rather than government bureaucracy, as the 
watchdogs of American business that would finally be enshrined with the New Deal.  
This trend began with a scandal in the insurance industry in New York in 1905.  To 
clean up the industry in the wake of revelations of financial improprieties, the large 
public accounting firms were called on to audit the companies.  Next, a consensus began 
to form that the data collected by the ICC was often inconsistent and unreliable. 
Although the Hepburn Act of 1906 attempted to correct these deficiencies, the idea of 
independent accountants preparing and verifying business disclosures became 
increasingly attractive.  The enactment of a federal excise tax in 1911 and the federal 
income tax in 1913 also swelled the ranks of accountants in the U.S. and gave the 
profession a more powerful voice. 
  But it was the government’s mobilization efforts in World War I that cemented 
public accounting’s place in American society.  “America’s entry into war changed the 
relationship between the profession and the federal government” (Miranti, 1990, p.103). 
The government quickly discovered that its bureaucracy was woefully inadequate to the 
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needs of a wartime economy, and the alliance that formed between business and 
government proved a boon to accountants.  Several American practitioners, including 
George O. May, took prominent places on the War Industries Board that greatly 
enhanced the profession’s reputation and prestige.  Investment in government war bonds, 
the so-called Liberty Loans, are credited with introducing passive securities investment 
to a broad swath of the American public, a trend that had begun during the merger 
movement of the 1890’s and would greatly expand in the 1920’s (Navin and Sears, 
1955, p.105). 
Louis Brandeis’ Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It was a 
collection of nine articles Brandeis had written beginning in 1913.  “More than any other 
document of the Progressive Era, Other People’s Money captured the anger that 
reformers felt about monopoly and their fears about what bigness could do to American 
democracy” (Urofsky in Brandeis, 1995, p.28).  Brandeis does not stress financial 
accounting as a means of regulation of big business, but in other writings he “counseled 
the [Wilson] administration to require industry to provide it” (Miranti, 1990, p.108).   
Financial statement audits became common among American big businesses in 
the years 1917-27.  This began with a 1917 memorandum issued by the American 
Institute of Accountants at the urging of the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Trade 
Commission.  “Uniform Accounting” , written under the direction of George O. May, 
was the first formal guidance in the United States on proper audit procedure, and 
reflected the government’s new respect for the profession ( Hawkins, 1963, p.155, Zeff , 
2003a, p.191).  However, the new stringency the memorandum encouraged was not 
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easily disseminated into corporate practice. “Despite their prestigious backers, the 
recommendations outlined in Uniform Accounting were not quickly adopted by 
corporations, bankers, or the accounting profession – chiefly, because bankers, out of a 
fear of driving away customers, refrained from insisting upon audited statements from 
their clients” (Hawkins, 1963, p.156).  As of 1927, public accountancy possessed neither 
the stature nor the professional unity to serve as effective financial gatekeepers.  But 
demands that it become so were only just beginning to be heard.   
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CHAPTER III 
 THE CRASH AND THE NEW DEAL, 1927-1934 
The role of the auditor in giving a seal of approval to corporate financial 
statements is something we take for granted today.  But as we saw in Chapter II, 
financial accounting did not play a central role in the development of American capital 
markets.  The CPA’s contribution as financial gatekeeper was largely defined in the 
years 1927-34.  It began with the publication of William Z. Ripley’s Main Street and 
Wall Street, which urged accountants to assert their independence from corporate 
management and assist in the development of transparency in corporate communications 
with investors, and ended with the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
a government agency that came to see the development of the accounting profession as 
one of its most important missions.  The crisis of the Great Depression led Americans to 
consider radical solutions, but their anti-statist bias was still too well ingrained to 
seriously contemplate a government takeover of corporate auditing.  Instead they placed 
the responsibility of corporate watchdog on an accounting profession unprepared to 
handle it. Over the remainder of the decade, the newly created Securities and Exchange 
Commission regularly threatened to wrest control of accounting standards away from the 
profession, until finally the humiliating McKesson-Robbins scandal made clear that 
public accounting had not achieved the standards of professionalism that the American 
regulatory system demanded of it.   But thrust into the public spotlight by Ripley, by the 
stock market crash of 1929, by the revelations of the Pecora congressional hearings, and 
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by the seminal reforms of the New Deal, public accounting began the process of molding 
itself into the profession it needed to be.  
I. Early Calls for Reform 
In 1922, the NYSE required all companies listed on its exchange to publish 
financial statements, although there was no requirement that they be audited (Carey, 
1969,  p.158). By 1923, more than 14 million Americans had money in the stock market.  
The so-called Blue Sky Laws, the uneven state regulations regarding the marketing of 
securities, were the only laws governing the sale of stock, and exact authority over the 
market for shares in the huge industrial enterprises Americans were investing in was 
unclear.  As Louis Brandeis had written, who should keep an eye on Other People’s 
Money?  Should regulation be conducted by the stock exchanges such as the NYSE, the 
federal government, or the individual states?  Exactly what role did audited financial 
statements play in this regulation?   
The most influential writing on this subject was a series of articles that appeared 
in Atlantic Monthly in 1926, published in book form as Main Street and Wall Street in 
1927 by an economics professor named William Z. Ripley.   The influence of Ripley’s 
writings has been noted by several historians.  In fact, the best known writing on market 
regulation and corporate governance of this era, Berle and Means The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, acknowledges a debt to Ripley in its preface.   It is 
also noted by John Carey in his official history of the AICPA.  And perhaps most 
importantly, Ripley’s writings stirred George O. May to action, as will be discussed 
below. 
42 
 
Main Street and Wall Street inherits the Progressive tradition of Louis Brandeis.  
Ripley sees the small shareholder as analogous to the citizen of a democracy: both 
needed organized interests to protect them from big business.  His often overwrought 
rhetoric puts him squarely in the Progressive tradition: “The institution of private 
property, underlying our whole civilization, is threatened at the root unless we take 
heed” (Ripley, 1927, p.83).  As he surveys the regulatory means available, he finds the 
existing state of affairs unequal to the task.   The Blue Sky laws had resulted only in “the 
scandalous prostitution of the sovereign power of the states” as states compete in a race 
to the bottom of regulatory enforcement to encourage business (Ripley, 1927, p.28).  He 
advocates public disclosure of information as the only realistic solution: “No other 
safeguard against misuse of power by insiders is so likely to be effective as publicity.  
Nothing kills bacteria like sunlight” (Ripley, 1927, p.109).   Ripley does not trust big 
business to publish reliable information on its own: “How averse will any one of them be 
to adopt a policy of disclosure until it becomes generally recognized as ‘good business’ 
to do so…the laggard corporation, persistent in secretiveness, lays a heavy penalty upon 
its rivals all down the line” (Ripley, 1927, pp.208,9).  He concludes that federal 
government regulation is needed for enforcement of disclosure requirements, writing 
“there are already at Washington three agencies which may conceivably become 
involved in these matters”(Ripley, 1927, p.114). 
And what role will accountants play in this new system?  Like Berle and Means 
in their classic Private Property and the Modern Corporation, we can see in Ripley a 
view that financial accounting is central to the proper functioning of a capital market.  
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This conclusion had been evolving in capital markets for decades, but the vital role 
Ripley and Berle and Means give to accounting marks a clear sea change.  Prior to their 
writings and the legislative reforms of the New Deal, “the influence of accountants 
remained small…the concept of the outside ‘independent auditor’ had not yet come of 
age in the United States” (McCraw, 1984, p. 167-8).  If for no other reason, the amount 
of space Ripley devotes in his writing to accounting and audit issues suggest the role he 
sees for accountants.   
But his opinion of the profession itself is another matter.  Ripley’s views of 
accounting are similar to many outside observers: bafflement at its technical minutia and 
suspicion of its practitioners’ allegiances.  Ripley views CPAs as subservient to 
management, and despairs of CPAs fulfilling the essential role he sets for them without 
formal, legal recognition of the independent audit.  He suggests “some permanent 
agency...[whose] primary function would have to do with adequate publicity through 
independent audit” (Ripley, 1927, pp.132-3).   And after sampling a “great pile of 
corporate pamphlets, the first impression is of their extraordinary diversity, in 
appearance, size, content, and intent” (Ripley, 1927, p.162).   He calls for standardized 
accounting rules to make financial statements more easily comparable, but is not 
confident that accountants, left to their own devices, will be able to agree on accounting 
standards.   
Ripley was certainly right to question whether accounting was up to the task he 
had set for them.  Even George May, by this time the most prominent accountant in the 
United States, doubted the profession’s readiness.  He wrote in 1926: “There is not in the 
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profession as it now exists a body of men capable of dealing adequately with the 
problem…at the present time auditors hold office usually at the pleasure of the officers 
of the company” (May, 1936, pp.44,6).  And Carman Blough, the first Chief Accountant 
of the Securities Exchange Commission, described the pre-New Deal profession this 
way: “Even through the first three decades of this century, professional public 
accounting made rather slow progress.  Much of its work was more or less detailed 
checking for the satisfaction of management, with little attention to the interests of 
creditors and investors” (Blough in Cooper and Ijiri, eds., 1979, p.31). Warren Nissley, 
then a senior partner at Arthur Andersen, also “became deeply concerned about the 
inadequacies of the financial reporting practices which then prevailed and the apparent 
lack of independence on the part of certain accounting firms” (Higgens, 1965, p. 166).  
And finally there is the view of James Landis, author of the Securities Acts: “The impact 
of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called leaders in their profession, 
often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management are stronger than their sense 
of responsibility to the investor.  Such an experience does not lead readily to 
acquiescence in the plea recently made by one of the leaders of the accounting 
profession [no doubt referring to George May] that the form of statement can be less 
rigidly controlled and left more largely to professional responsibility alone.  Simplicity 
and more adequate presentation is of course an end much to be desired, but a simplicity 
that misleads is not to be tolerated” (Higgens, 1965, p. 166). 
For the most part, the accounting profession had so little sense of public opinion 
that it did not even take notice of Main Street and Wall Street.   But the book did make 
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an impression on George O. May. May began his career in America in 1896, sent by the 
British firm of Price Waterhouse to study the American railroads Europeans so heavily 
invested in.  He held a senior position on the War Productions Board during the First 
World War, as government turned to business to handle the tasks it did not have the 
bureaucracy to handle itself.   And when Ripley’s articles began appearing in Atlantic 
Monthly in 1926, May was one of the few accountants who saw the writing on the wall, 
and began to push for reforms of financial accounting and audit requirements. 
May credits Ripley with bringing accounting issues to the attention of the 
investing public (May Papers, 57-6, 1960).  He writes: “I have been in conference with 
economists and lawyers, and I have been struck by their insistence on the importance of 
accounting in the proper development of the corporate system” (May Papers 53-6, 
1930).  Again we see hints that the accounting profession’s slow response to the calls for 
reform was rooted in their complete ignorance of the tenor of public opinion:  they did 
not even appreciate how important their own profession had come to be seen. 
Much like the muckrakers of a previous generation, Ripley’s critiques often lack 
both sophistication and solutions. He warns of “inroads upon shareholders’ rights” 
without describing what these rights should be or when they were ever practiced (Ripley, 
1927, p.39).   It is also not clear whether Ripley actually knew what he was talking 
about, at least in regard to accounting.  Ripley himself freely confesses his ignorance of 
accounting issues, and George May certainly did not think much of Ripley’s arguments 
(Ripley, 1927, p.198).  In a letter to the New York Times, May carefully demolishes 
Ripley’s criticisms of corporate financial statements, writing that his assessments of the 
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financial statements of Bethlehem Steel and National Cash Register are factually wrong 
and concluding: “It is…wholly unfortunate that Professor Ripley should in his 
enthusiasm for his objective have allowed himself to be betrayed into inaccuracy and 
injustice of statement”(May Papers, 63-12, 1926).  May’s letter suggests that 
accountants’ inability to control the debate over reform of capital markets can at least 
partly be attributed to a failure in public relations.  Ripley may not have understood the 
technical accounting issues he was criticizing, but his sweeping, seemingly learned 
arguments captured the public’s attention and thus controlled the debate.  Ignorance of 
accounting issues is a charge May would level against most of his adversaries at the SEC 
over the coming decades. 
II.  George O. May’s Response to Ripley 
The importance of the 1929 Crash in reforming the stock market has probably 
been exaggerated by historians.  A simple timeline makes clear that the pressure for 
reform from writers such as Ripley predated the Crash, and important reforms were not 
actually implemented by private organizations until 1932 and by government until 
FDR’s administration.  But if we take 1927 and the publication of Main Street and Wall 
Street, and not the Great Crash of 1929, as the seminal event behind the reform of 
American capital markets, we are still left with the question of why reform was so slow, 
and why the voluntary reforms of the NYSE and the accounting profession (below) were 
not enough to preempt federal intervention.  The answer is simple enough:  Wall Street, 
in which I include the elite of the accounting profession, was too narrow minded and 
isolated from the larger culture to appreciate the pull of public opinion: CPAs like 
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George O. May expected to be taken at their word that they were trustworthy, and 
viewed regulation as superfluous and probably as offensive.    This is how the 
Accounting Review, the journal of accounting professors, described the American 
Institute of Accountants, the organization of elite, Wall Street accountants: “The Institute 
is the survival of another generation – a static, supremely self-satisfied organization” 
(“Corporate Accounts and Reports”, 1933, p.164).  Unsatisfied with the AIA’s foot 
dragging in writing formal accounting principles, accounting professors under the 
leadership of Accounting Review’s editor, Eric Kohler, attempted to take the initiative 
themselves by publishing “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles Underlying 
Corporate Finanical Statements” in 1936 (Zeff in Cooper and Ijiri, eds., 1979,  p.8).  
This would be the central tension in the evolution of American accounting into a true 
profession.  It is accepted today that a large-scale, industrial economy requires formal 
regulation in order to be ruled by laws and not men.   Accounting would never achieve 
the status of a true, independent profession without recognizing this.  Only when the 
profession was pulled away from the leadership of the Wall Street elite would it be ready 
to accept the role Ripley and the New Dealers envisioned for them.  The battle over the 
next decade would be to formalize the practice of accounting through legal liability, the 
setting of accounting standards, the granting of an exclusive legal franchise to conduct 
financial statement audits, and most importantly the inclusion of all practicing 
accountants in a single professional body.     
Accounting’s elite had selfish motives for obstructing any changes in the 
accounting profession, fearing that reform would legitimize a broader segment of the 
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profession.  Edwin Perkins writes: “Reputable investment firms and the officials of 
leading stock exchanges did not advocate the passage of protective legislation because 
they relied on the uncertainties associated with over-the-counter markets to retain the 
allegiance of existing customers who were reluctant to invest in unlisted stocks” 
(Perkins, 1999, p.132).  This story, applied to the accounting profession, has been told 
by Paul Miranti.  Wall Street accountants like George May and represented by the 
American Institute of Accountants feared that increasing the reach of the accounting 
profession would mean allowing into the profession men of inferior background and 
training, by which they meant accountants from the Midwest, South and West who had 
gone to local colleges, worked for small, local firms, and often hailed from the newer 
immigrant groups from Southern and Eastern Europe.  These men (and they were almost 
all men before World War II) constituted the vast majority of American CPAs and were 
represented by the rival organization to the AIA, the American Society of Certified 
Public Accountants.  Giving these men a voice in the profession would threaten the 
elite’s comfortable place in the American business world.  The elite had plenty of work 
auditing the largest American corporations, and no desire to rock the boat by demanding 
more independence from their clients: “Years of uninterrupted prosperity for the large 
national firms, with the control of the profession as a natural by-product of their growth, 
have built up a complacency and sense of security which are now being rudely shaken” 
(“Standards Must Come”, 1934, p.334). 
But private reform achieved major advances in capital market regulation, and the 
eventual federal intervention would largely build on these reforms. Particularly on 
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accounting issues, the private reforms put in place before the New Deal were arguably of 
more importance than the Securities Acts themselves.  Perhaps ironically, they were 
initiated by the doyen of the accounting elite, George May, in the hope of retaining the 
initiative in reform.  Audits of Corporate Accounts, published in 1934 by the New York 
Stock Exchange, was the work of a committee of the American Institute of Accountants 
cooperating with the NYSE (American Institute of Accountants Special Committee on 
Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, 1934).  Its chief author was George May.  The 47-
page pamphlet was written directly in response to Ripley’s Main Street and Wall Street, 
and it was May’s hope that “Audits” would head off the drive for federal legislation 
(Grady, ed. 1962, p.57).  His efforts might have been successful were it not for the 
Pecora hearings and the election of FDR.   
Audits of Corporate Accounts is arguably the most important single document in 
the history of American public accounting.  It outlines the purposes and limitations May 
envisioned for the corporate audit.   As May wrote to his chief contact and collaborator 
at the NYSE, J.M.B. Hoxsey: “The old forms of account were designed for proprietors 
familiar with the business.  With ownership becoming widely distributed among persons 
unfamiliar with the business, and with substantial fractions of the ownership changing 
hands every year, it may well be that some radical change in the form of presentation is 
necessary”(Grady, ed., 1962, p.59).  Contrary to what would be written by New Dealers 
and historians about accounting, May clearly understood the profession’s chief 
obligation was to the small shareholder.   
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A need clearly existed to codify best practices in auditing and financial 
accounting.  As one observer described it: “Some practicing accountants and a few 
teachers undertook to write books, but they simply took what they considered the best of 
what they had learned in practice and combined it with what they thought should be 
done and what they had seen in others’ writings.  Some of these authors, whether due to 
lack of knowledge or intent to improve, often presented procedures they considered ideal 
and which in fact did not reflect then-current practice” (Blough in Cooper and Ijiri, eds., 
1979, p.33). 
The pamphlet lays out both the basic form financial statements should take (e.g. 
that previous years’ statements should be presented for comparison, and that the income 
statement should show separately operating income, extraordinary items, and income 
taxes) and sets the standard for all future regulation by coining the phrase “fairly general 
acceptance” which would later evolve into today’s well-known “generally accepted 
accounting principles” (American Institute of Accountants, 1932, p.12).   May felt that 
allowing corporations to choose from a broad array of accounting practices was 
preferable to so-called “bright-line” accounting where specific rules are put in place for 
all financial statements to follow.   This basic philosophy suggests one of the greatest 
tensions in the accounting profession for May and his generation.  May generally was 
suspicious of the need for strict rules and regulations governing the actions of 
professionals like himself; he felt that their judgment and integrity were sufficient 
safeguards against abuse.  This is why he resisted allowing accountants with less training 
than himself to join the profession (class and ethnic issues notwithstanding) and why he 
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found himself in conflict with the New Dealers: elite professionals of May’s generation 
recoiled at the very thought that their judgment might be questioned.  Formal rules of 
accounting and of auditing procedure were necessary only for those who lacked the 
training of the Wall Street elite.  This is the central reason why the AIA opposed joining 
with the ASCPA: fear that poorly trained accountants would lower the standards of the 
profession.  As May writes, referring to the ASCPA: “The raison d’etre of these rival 
societies is largely an unwillingness to accept the Institute’s standard of ethics” (May 
Papers 53-6, 1928).  J.P. Morgan, Jr., in testimony before the Pecora Committee in 1933, 
states that bankers are subject to a code of ethics so exacting that “we have never been 
satisfied with simply keeping within the law” (Seligman, 1982, p.32). Similarly, when 
the President of the NYSSCPA , Colonel Arthur Carter, testified before Congress on the 
proposed Securities Act, the famous exchange that followed illustrates the generational 
and class chasm that separated the New Dealers from Wall Street in this era:  
Sen. Barkley: You audit the controllers? 
Col. Carter: Yes, the public accountant audits the controller’s account. 
Sen. Barkley: Who audits you? 
Col. Carter: Our conscience. (United States Congress, 1933, p.58). 
The limited accounting standards set in Audits of Corporate Accounts did not win 
universal acceptance within the profession, many of whom saw the need for a more 
expansive set of formalized rules.  This was the reaction of the Accounting Review, the 
journal of accounting professors.  It summarizes May’s proposals this way: “Rather than 
impose rules devised ‘by competent authority,’ let each corporation ‘choose its own 
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methods of accounting,’ for the greatest value attaching to uniform accounts is the 
disclosure of method followed and the ‘consistency of method which they tend to 
produce.’ Mr. May states that the method of reporting earnings is unimportant to the 
investor provided the investor knows the method.”  They conclude: “But is disclosure 
without more than the meager standardization indicated a sufficient safeguard for the 
average investor? Mr. May vouchsafes no answer” (“Corporate Accounts and Reports”, 
1933, p.164).  Audits of Corporate Accounts again betrays May’s belief that 
professionals could be trusted to make the right judgment.  A lack of uniformity in 
different companies’ presentation of financial statements makes them less accessible to 
the reader, whether that reader is a trained accountant or not.  This would be a point 
stressed by the New Deal reformers and later by the SEC, and the reluctance of May and 
the rest of the profession’s elite to set detailed rules for financial statements would be a 
major source of tension in the battles to come.  
III.  The New Deal and the Securities Acts 
Joel Seligman, in his study of the SEC, The Transformation of Wall Street, 
portrays the passage of the Securities Acts as a political response to the public outrage 
over the revelations of the Pecora hearings, which, among other things, described 
excessive executive salaries and the notorious fraud case of the Match King, Ivar 
Kruegar (see also Fleshman and Fleshman, 1987).   But Seligman’s conclusions draw 
too neat a line from the Crash to the Securities Acts; the push from writers like William 
Ripley had been building for years.  George May himself would state in December of 
1933: “No one who has watched closely the developments of the past 10 years can 
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wonder that a securities law should be enacted, or even be greatly surprised at the form it 
has taken” (Landis Papers, Box 12, 1933).   But the accounting profession’s reaction 
does make clear just how politically clueless the profession was in this era.  No less 
sympathetic a source than the AICPA’s official historian, John Carey, concludes:  
“Despite William Z. Ripley, despite Berle and Means, despite the Pecora investigation, 
despite public demand for reform of the securities markets, the Institute had made no 
effective preparation to deal with legislation directed to that end” (Carey, 1969, p.182).  
The Accounting Review similarly doubted the profession’s ability to rise to the challenge 
of the New Dealers: “A new day will dawn for the accountant, however weakly and 
fatuously he may resist its coming” (“Standards Must Come”, 1934, p.335).  But the 
Securities Acts would prove to be an almost unmitigated triumph for accountants: they 
received the legitimacy they had long sought as an integral cog in capital markets, the 
power to set accounting standards themselves, and even, eventually, to limit their legal 
liability.  How they accomplished this is a story that has puzzled several outstanding 
historians.   
Not that the profession itself embraced the Securities Act of 1933.  Without 
exception, it seems, they were particularly incensed by the legal liability it imposed on 
accountants.  The Act held accountants liable for any “omission of material facts,” and 
allowed the auditor to be sued even if the plaintiff could not prove they had relied on the 
misstatement when purchasing the stock.  The response from accountants was 
apoplectic: “The accounting officer as well as the independent public accountant see 
their public recognition greatly enhanced, but along with this welcome enhancement of 
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standing comes a burden of responsibility that is truly appalling.  The risk assumed by an 
accountant-officer or by a professional accountant, who signs the registration statement 
submitted to the Securities Commission of the Federal Trade Commission is quite out of 
proportion to the possible material benefits that may be derived from the service 
rendered” (Weidenhammer, 1933, p.272).  Robert Chatov, a lawyer and author of one of 
the best histories of the American accounting profession in the twentieth century, largely 
agrees that the liability provisions imposed by the 1933 Act were excessive, calling it “a 
major departure in American law:…the plaintiff no longer had to prove the guilt of the 
defendant, as traditionally required for civil liability in a negligence action” (Chatov, 
1975, p.58). 
Landis, in a brief history of the Securities Acts written in 1959, cites the English 
Companies Act as the model on which the American Securities Acts were based.   But 
Seligman argues persuasively that the NYSE’s listing requirements, more detailed than 
the English Companies Act, were the true predecessor.     This would suggest, as Carey 
in fact does, that May’s efforts with Audit of Corporate Accounts came just in time.  By 
providing at least a basic outline of what regulation of financial statements might look 
like, Audit of Corporate Accounts may have prevented a wholesale rethinking by the 
federal government of accounting reports.   
The 1933 Securities Act mandated financial statement audits for all publicly 
traded companies making initial stock issues.  These were to be conducted by “public or 
certified public accountants.”  It required the release of balance sheets and income 
statements for each of the previous three years. And it left the question of setting 
55 
 
accounting standards open. These provisions were obviously a tremendous boon to 
accountants, who with this grant of an exclusive legal franchise now had the 
independence from management they had long sought.  What accountants did not care 
for were the Act’s liability provisions.  Accountants greatly feared the liabilities given 
them under the ‘33 Act, and were not shy about saying so.  On more than one occasion, 
May obliquely threatened that accountants would refuse to engage in audits of public 
companies under this provision, a point no less an authority than William O. Douglas, 
later Chairman of the SEC, seemed to endorse: “It may be expected that the more 
reputable [accounting] firms will be more chary than ever of becoming experts for any 
but the more substantial issuers” (Douglas and Bates, 1933, p.171). 
But part of the blame for the profession’s hostility must also fall on James 
Landis, the chief author of the Securities Acts and the Roosevelt administration’s chief 
spokesman on securities issues.  One historian concluded that “in both the design and the 
early administration [of the SEC], the most influential person…[was Landis]” (McCraw, 
1984, p.154).   His wariness and even hostility towards accountants is suggested in his 
remarks before the New York State Society of CPA’s in October of 1933: “Sometimes I 
have wondered whether you, just like the members of my profession, do not tend to 
make more mysterious your own knowledge so as to widen the gulf that separates you 
and us from the ordinary unsuspecting layman.”  He continues: “If half of the energy 
that has been expended in fulminating against the Act and propagandizing for 
amendments were enlisted in the effort to advise the Commission in the wise exercise of 
its powers, the government and issuers, bankers, lawyers and accountants would be far 
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nearer to a solution of their problems” (Landis papers, Box 12, 1933). But in fairness to 
the accountants Landis was so frustrated by, the Act gave only the outline of the 
regulation its authors intended.  Subsequent to its passage, the accounting profession was 
hastily enlisted to help write the specific regulations: “When the Federal Trade 
Commission began to wrestle with the problem of interpreting the Act, as all of us know 
and as Commissioner Landis knows, the professional accountant was very happy to 
respond to the call of the Commission to assist in helping to frame some of the 
interpretive regulations.  Our own president spent quite a few days…the American 
Society yanked three or four of us out from far more comfortable surroundings to work 
with them and the members of the Commission’s staff in the summer heat of 
Washington.  The American Institute did likewise” (Landis Papers, Box 12, 1933).  
When he spoke before the New York State Society in October of 1933, Landis faced a 
barrage of technical questions from accountants on interpreting and complying with the 
Securities Act.  His response to accountants’ concerns was essentially that they should 
trust him: “The standard is one of reasonableness.  I repeat that over and over again: 
reasonableness.”  SEC Chairman Joseph Kennedy also echoes these concerns: 
“Remember the Act is new – the Commission is learning” (Landis Papers, Box 12, 
1933). What the profession feared were endless lawsuits against auditors anytime the 
share price of a company they had certified plummeted.  Landis attempts to reassure 
accountants that the courts would limit the liability judgments against them in practice.  
Surely he knew that such ambiguousness would not reassure a hyper cautious accounting 
profession.    
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Given this, the almost universal hostility of historians to accountants’ role in the 
creation of the Acts seems somewhat harsh.  Their view is largely taken from Landis, 
who apparently possessed a great deal of hostility for George May particularly.  Landis 
took the trouble of specifically singling out May for criticism in a brief (20 page) article 
in a legal journal, writing in a footnote: “Despite the fact now generally recognized that 
the registration requirements of the Securities Acts have introduced into the accounting 
profession ethical and professional standards comparable to those of other recognized 
professions, the then dean of the accounting profession, George O. May of Price, 
Waterhouse & Co., was strangely opposed to our proposed requirements for independent 
accountants” (Landis, 1959, p.35).  Landis seems to have had in mind specifically the 
liability provisions of the Securities Acts.  It was on this point that Wall Street would 
challenge the New Dealers, in what one historian has called “some of the most bruising 
lobbying struggles ever waged in Washington” (Seligman, 1982, p.72).  George May 
played a leading role in this effort, which succeeded in scaling back the liability 
provisions under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to state that the defendant may 
escape liability by proving that he had acted in good faith and had no knowledge that the  
financial statements were misleading. 
For our purposes, the central story is how the profession lobbied for these 
amendments, how successful they were, and what parameters they set for accounting’s 
lobbying in the future.   The profession was able to bypass Congress and lobby Landis 
directly because, with Congressman Sam Rayburn’s help, the bills were passed largely 
as the New Dealers wrote them.  There is little evidence that May or anyone else met 
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with any congressmen specifically on the Securities bill, though there is abundant 
evidence they met frequently with Landis, Kennedy, and later Carman Blough as Chief 
Accountant of the SEC.      
Why Landis chose to rely on accounting to set its own standards is made clear by 
his correspondence.   He did not have the expertise to question accounting issues, and on 
more than one occasion is corrected by accountants on technical matters.   The 
correspondence makes clear that the SEC was utterly dependent on accountants to 
prepare the Acts and subsequent accounting regulations.  This is particularly notable in 
letters exchanged between Landis and leading accountants on the now standard phrase in 
the auditor’s report, “in our opinion.”     Walter Staub, a senior partner at Lybrand, Ross, 
wrote to Landis expressing surprise that the use of the term “in our opinion” had 
suddenly been disallowed.  In a careful response, and a subsequent one from May, both 
men lay out that the term is both appropriate, because as Landis himself had stated, 
accounting is more a matter of judgment than fact, and that it had long been in use in 
auditors’ reports (Landis Papers, Box 7-5, 1933).  
Landis’ only option would have been to recruit an army of accountants to work 
for the SEC, rather than allow private accountants to set the regulations.  There was 
certainly, among accountants in any case, a real fear that government would take the 
audit franchise for themselves.  May would continue to write into the 1950s that such an 
outcome was “narrowly avoided” in 1933 (May Papers, 56-10, 1952).   And Landis 
faced direct questions on this point:  “This newspaper feared the setting up of a large 
bureaucracy to audit accounts of corporations and thereby to threaten the work of fifty 
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years or more in this country toward building up the standard of audits by independent 
certified public accountants” (Landis Papers, Folder 2-3, 1933).  As many noted at the 
time, precedent did exist for American government intervention in public accounting.   A 
capital issues committee had been created during WWI, and since 1920 the Interstate 
Commerce Commission exercised control over railroad securities (Weidenhammer, 
1933, p.273).   But the fears of accountants seem hyperbolic in retrospect.  As historians 
of the New Deal, particularly McCraw and Parrish, make clear, the philosophy behind 
the Securities Acts, a product largely of Felix Frankfurter and his protégé Landis, was to 
set in place a broad structure of regulation under which private groups, including stock 
exchanges, lawyers, brokers, and accountants, would continue to operate.  Large 
government bureaucracies would be unworkable and not in keeping with the philosophy 
of the New Deal (Parrish, 1970, p.208, McCraw, 1984, p.186). 
A myth persists that the testimony before Congress of Colonel Arthur Carter, 
then President of the New York State Society of CPAs, is responsible for preventing a 
government takeover of the audit profession (see for example Zeff, 2003a, p.192).  
Carter’s testimony received scant coverage in the press (see New York Times 4/2/33 p.1 
and Wall Street Journal 4/3/33 p.8), and little reference was made to it at the time by any 
of the players in the creation of the Securities Acts.  
What emerges most clearly from the extant historical record is the unwarranted 
harshness of opinion from both sides.  The Securities Acts left the accounting profession 
in charge of regulating itself, even though it had shown scant ability to do so in the past.   
Setting the exact parameters for the relationship between the accounting profession and 
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its putative overseer, the SEC, would be a difficult process that took place over several 
years, frequently evolving by way of crises and ad-hoc decision making.  Little wonder 
it proved so difficult. 
One question in particular has exercised historians’ skills: what impact finally did 
the Securities Acts have on American business generally and financial reporting 
specifically, and how effective has the SEC been?  
The most comprehensive economic analysis of this question is “Required 
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934” by George Benston (1973).  As he writes, “The economic rationale for the 
regulation of the securities markets was not examined carefully before the legislation 
was passed (which is not surprising given turbulent times) nor has it been since” 
(Benston, 1973, p.132).  All companies listed on the NYSE and the Curb (American) 
Exchange were already required to undergo annual audits by independent CPAs when 
the Securities Acts were enacted, and these combined included 83% of all publicly 
traded companies (Benston, 1973, p.142).    Further, Benston’s econometric analyses 
find no support for the contention that the Acts improved the quality of published 
financial statements.   
My own unscientific review of several companies’ financial statements from the 
1920s and 1930s largely confirms Benston’s view, and suggests that the Securities Acts 
had little impact, at least on the form of financial statements and auditor’s reports. 
Among the thirteen companies studied, twelve annually underwent audits for several 
years prior to the Securities Acts, although generally only the balance sheet was audited 
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even when an income statement was also presented.  The length and detail of the 
financial statements shows little evolution throughout the period studied, including in the 
years after the Securities Acts.  Extensive Management Discussion and Analysis sections 
also predated the Securities Acts.  These usually review the company’s performance for 
the past year and often discuss accounting issues.  For example, S.S. White Dental 
Manufacturing Company includes in its 1931 MD&A: “Among the items of major 
importance should be mentioned the write-off necessitated through the depreciation of 
foreign exchange, particularly the loss sustained through the abandonment of the gold 
standard by Great Britain in the early fall”  (Hagley Museum and Library, Annual 
Reports, 1931). The 1933 Act mandated the presentation of three years’ comparative 
statements, but this appears to have been a practice not uncommon in the 1920’s.  
Goodwill, patents, and trademarks are frequently included as assets and amortized 
annually.  For most companies, inventory and accounts receivable were not directly 
confirmed before the reforms following the McKesson Robbins scandal (See Ch.3) .   
This leaves the question: were auditors truly independent of management before 
the Securities Acts?  The conclusions of May, Carman Blough, and Warren Nissley, all 
leaders of the profession in this era, as well as that of James Landis, suggests the answer 
is no.  The extant historical record leaves little basis to challenge this conclusion, since 
little correspondence between management and their outside auditors survives from this 
era.  But among the evidence available, two supplementary audit reports offer an 
intriguing challenge to the conventional view of the public accountant’s place vis-à-vis 
his client in the pre-New Deal era.  Reports prepared to accompany the annual audits by 
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Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery for Lukens Steel Company for the years 1925-
34 (Hagley Museum and Library, Accession No.50, Box 2187) and by Ernst & Ernst for 
Strawbridge and Clothier for 1923 (Hagley Museum and Library, Accession No. 2117, 
Box 18) suggest that an auditor’s role in these years far exceeded mere footing of 
accounts.   The substance of these reports seems closer to the modern role of the auditor, 
suggesting improvements in the client’s accounting and internal control practices. From 
Lybrand, Ross Brothers 1927 report to Luken Steel:  “Your company’s policy with 
respect to charges for repairs, at least during the period of our examination, has been 
most liberal, and we noted in the fiscal years ended October 31, 1924 and 1925, a 
number of items classed as repairs, amounting in the aggregate to a substantial sum, 
which in our opinion, under a stricter accounting might have been handled either as 
capital charges or as charges against the reserves for depreciation.”  And from 1929: “It 
therefore appears that the payment of such a bonus represents a distribution of a part of 
the Company’s profits to its officers and men rather than an operating expense and as 
such is properly shown as a non-operating charge” (Hagley Museum and Library, 
Accession No.50, Box 2187).  We can also see Ernst & Ernst standing its ground with 
Strawbridge and Clothier in 1923: “We made test checks of the quantities on hand in the 
store…A notable difference that existed was in the China Department, which we made 
the subject of a special investigation and ascertained the reasons for the existence of the 
difference.  This was mainly occasioned by the fact that the Retail Inventory Method had 
not been carefully followed in that department, and as a result of several conferences 
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with the department head and your Comptroller we believe better results will be obtained 
in the future” ( Hagley Museum and Library, Accession No. 2117, Box 18).  
But this belies the conclusions of virtually all the participants.  Carman Blough 
describes the changes wrought by the Acts this way: “One can hardly imagine the impact 
on the financial and accounting world of having previously confidential information on 
over 2,000 companies suddenly thrown open to the public” (Blough in Cooper and Ijiri, 
eds., 1979, p.36).  As noted previously, the Acts brought uniformity and comparability to 
financial statements and to the attached auditor’s report, which in the 1920’s frequently 
included so many qualifications to the auditor’s opinion as to make them virtually 
worthless (Taylor in Previts, 1981, p.76).  Whether this would have been achieved by 
private initiatives such as Audits of Corporate Accounts will remain a mystery, since the 
Securities Acts followed so closely on the heels of this publication. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROFESSION, 1935-1956 
The reforms of the New Deal, wrenching as they were for accounting, had little 
impact on the profession over the course of the 1930’s.  The Wall Street elite, men like 
George O. May, remained firmly entrenched in the profession’s leadership, much to the 
consternation of accounting’s new overseers at the SEC (Parrish, 1970, p.208), and the 
contention that the Securities Acts improved the quality of financial reporting is open to 
dispute (See Chapter III). The forces driving public accountancy towards higher 
standards of professionalism would work slowly over the next two decades.  The 
unification of the profession into one national organization in 1936 was the first step 
towards broadening the leadership’s outlook to embrace CPAs throughout the United 
States.  The McKesson-Robbins scandal would undermine the elite’s claim to leadership 
of the profession and open a path for a new generation with a more expansive view of 
the profession’s responsibilities (Carey, 1970, p.40).  The massive increase in the 
profession’s numbers caused by the move away from temporary audit workers in the 
wake of McKesson-Robbins, the domestic labor shortages of World War II, the demand 
for tax accountants as government increasingly relied on income taxes to fund the cold 
war, and the postwar economic boom all led to a reorientation of the profession’s 
national leadership towards the needs of the small, local practitioner and away from the 
Big-8 firms.  
 Previts and Merino look disapprovingly on this period in the profession’s 
history: “The stress on limitations seems to have had unfortunate ramifications.  In 
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subsequent years, the emphasis continued to be not on what auditors can do, but on what 
they cannot do.  This negative orientation raised serious questions about the willingness 
of the profession to meet its social expectations effectively…[Accountants] have been 
reluctant to extend their activities to become societal watchdogs…After WWII, when 
accountants could have pressed to extend their responsibilities, they did not” (Previts and 
Merino, 1998, pp.293, 318). I believe their conclusions are based on a too narrow focus 
on controversies surrounding corporate financial reporting. By the late 1950’s, an 
evolution in accounting’s leadership had taken place, manifested most clearly as the 
AICPA eagerly offered its services to help clean up corruption in pensions and trade 
unions during the labor corruption scandals of the 1950s, accepting a new role (and new 
legal liability) as financial watchdog that brought it closer to an altruistic model of a 
profession with responsibilities to society.  But CPAs would also become more 
aggressive in protecting their professional turf, and in expanding the profession’s reach 
to any new line of business that offered additional revenue, including management 
consulting.  And accounting would lose the image that the old Wall Street elite had for 
CPAs, of a profession above politics and self-promotion, a disinterested profession. 
I.  The Merger of CPAs  
John Carey, in his official history of the AICPA, describes the division of the 
profession into two rival national associations as the “Great Schism”.  Since 1921, and 
crucially during the New Deal reforms, accounting lacked an authoritative voice as 
CPA’s divided along lines of clientele as well as class.  When the AIA and ASCPA 
finally merged in 1937, the profession took a crucial step forward in its evolution. 
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The leadership of American accounting in its formative years was comprised 
largely of transplanted British accountants, most notably George O. May.  These men 
headed the largest American firms that were headquartered on Wall Street and whose 
clients included the largest American industrial enterprises.  As the American economy 
expanded in the first decades of the twentieth century, the demand for CPAs expanded 
beyond the confines of New York, and the typical American accountant increasingly 
became a sole practitioner doing basic accounting, tax, and auditing work for small and 
mid-sized businesses.  These accountants were also often first or second generation 
Americans from Central and Eastern Europe, creating further tensions with the Wall 
Street elite.  As John Carey wrote, many accountants were “suspicious of a national 
organization whose headquarters was in New York, and many of whose prominent 
members were of British origins” (Carey, 1970. p.324).   
Tensions reached a boiling point when the American Institute of Accountants 
reorganized in 1916 and relegated all accounting educators, financial controllers, and 
cost accountants to non-voting status within the organization.  As a result, all three of 
these groups formed their own associations (Miranti, 1990, p. 134).  In 1921, the AIA 
voted to follow the example of the American Bar Association and ban advertising by 
members.  It was this issue more than any other that would truly divide the profession.  
The Wall Street firms obtained sufficient business without the benefit of advertising, but 
smaller practices around the country did not have that luxury.  The final straw was the 
AIA’s attempt to supersede the treasured CPA designation with their own certification 
available only to AIA members.  In the uproar over this attempt to relegate the vast 
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majority of CPA’s to second-class status, the American Society of Certified Public 
Accountants was created in 1921 (Miranti, 1990, pp.119-120, Carey, 1969, p.324).   
Over the course of the 1920s, the AIA continued to isolate itself from the 
majority of the profession.  The national firms concerned themselves primarily with the 
sophisticated accounting required for big, publicly traded companies, issues of little 
relevance to practitioners serving small businesses.  For some in the AIA, admitting a 
broader swath of the profession into their organization risked cheapening their status.  
George May concluded in 1928: “The raison d’etire of these rival societies is largely an 
unwillingness to accept the Institute’s standards of ethics” (May papers, 53-6, 1928). 
By the 1930s, the Schism was making both national organizations increasingly 
irrelevant.  The majority of CPAs belonged to neither group.  Instead, the state societies 
were the primary organization most accountants turned to.  As one AIA member lectured 
his peers: “I think that the Institute is at the crossroads, and the council has got to decide 
whether or not it intends to remain a smug, concise, small organization, representing 
high ideals and a certain group of the accounting profession, or whether it wants to go on 
and be truly representative of the entire profession” (Carey, 1969, p.362). This hostility 
towards the AIA put increasing pressure on the accounting elite to broaden their 
membership: John Carey writes that most CPA’s favored a merger between the AIA and 
the ASCPA, and that “the Institute was generally unpopular” with the rank and file of 
the profession (Carey, 1969, p.357-8).   Some began taking steps to modernize the 
profession without the national organizations.  In the early 1930’s, Arthur Young partner 
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Warren Nissley spearheaded a push to recruit more college graduates into the profession 
rather than relying on importing British chartered accountants (Higgens, 1965, p.123). 
Paul Miranti concluded that the profession’s divisions were largely responsible 
for the profession’s slow response to the tumultuous events of the late 1920s and early 
1930s.  As we have seen, it was the accounting elite, led by May, that embodied the 
public face of accounting during these years, but their authority was undermined by the 
fact that they spoke for a small minority of practicing CPAs (Carey, 1969, p.355).  As 
Miranti writes, it was a desire to present a stronger, united front that motivated the AIA 
to finally merge with the ASCPA in 1937.    This was a crucial step towards the 
democratization of the profession, providing all practicing CPA’s with equal status 
within the national organization and thereby forcing it to address the needs of CPA’s 
beyond Wall Street. 
 II.  Standard Setting 
Although the two rival organizations had made peace, the Wall Street elite 
retained effective control of the AIA.  When the SEC began to press accountants to 
develop more standardized rules for financial reporting, men like George May resisted, 
believing the brief Audits of Corporate Accounts was sufficient and that the details of 
financial accounting should be left to professional judgment.  It would take prodding 
from the SEC to motivate the profession.  This effort was led by SEC Chief Accountant 
Carman Blough, who told the New York Society of CPAs in 1937: “Almost daily, 
principles that for years I had thought were definitely accepted among the members of 
the profession are violated in a registration statement prepared by some accountant in 
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whom I have high confidence.  Indeed, an examination of hundreds of statements filed 
with our Commission almost leads one to the conclusion that aside from the simple rules 
of double entry bookkeeping, there are very few principles of accounting upon which the 
accountants of this country are in agreement” (Zeff, 1971,  p.132).  John Carey would 
write: “The cumulative effect of this speech was devastating” (Carey, 1970, p.11).  
Blough would later add: “Unless the profession took steps to reduce the areas of 
difference in accounting practices the Commission would” (Zeff, 1971, p.132).   The 
SEC in fact had little desire to write accounting rules themselves, both because most of 
them were not accountants and because they had little staff to do the work  (Seligman, 
1982, p.197-201, Chatov, 1975, p. 178;  see also Cooper & Robinson, 1987, p.137-140). 
It was Blough’s hope that the profession would accept the challenge: “I have emphasized 
at numerous times that the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission was to 
encourage the accountants to develop uniformity of procedure themselves, in which case 
we would follow”  (American Institute of Accountants, 1937, p.190). 
Although the profession certainly merits criticism for its reluctance to write 
standards, Robert Chatov also sees their response as consistent with the common law 
tradition of the United States and Britain.  Whereas “systematic legal codification is the 
method of the civil code nations,” including most of Europe, in the United States and 
Britain ad-hoc court decisions form the basis for the legal environment.  From this 
followed the position of the profession’s leadership that accountants should follow 
accepted practice rather than write an extensive body of rules (Chatov, 1975, p178-9).   
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Capture theory, the idea that the regulating agency eventually falls under the 
influence of the group it is regulating, may also explain the SEC’s reluctance to take the 
rule-making power away from accounting practitioners.  Chatov writes of the SEC’s 
battles of the 1930s: “The entire process illustrates the limited power of an independent 
regulatory agency in the face of massive resistance from its regulated constituency” 
(Chatov, 1975, p.182). 
Certainly the SEC was not happy with the progress accountants made in taking 
control of financial reporting practices.  The Committee on Accounting Procedure, a 
creation of the AIA, finally began issuing regular pronouncements in 1939, but this did 
not relieve concerns at the SEC that accountants remained beholden to their clients.  
Upon being named SEC Chairman in May of 1939, Jerome Frank pronounced: “We 
want to be sure that the public never has reason to lose faith in the reports of public 
accountants.  To this end the independence of the public accountant must be preserved 
and strengthened” (NYT 5/19/39 p. 36.  See also Carey, 1970, p.61). 
We can begin to see in the fight over accounting standards the demarcation that 
would symbolize the profession’s evolution in the coming decades.  This fundamental 
philosophical difference was personified in George O. May and Carman Blough.   May, 
as we have seen, represented the older generation dominated by the Wall Street elite.  He 
grudgingly tolerated the SEC and anyone else who tried to tell accountants how to 
practice accounting.   He fought the standard setting process, believing well-trained 
professionals should rely on their own judgment, and was reluctant to expand the AIA’s 
membership to accountants he saw as inferior in quality.  He also disdained public 
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relations of any kind, not only because it was unnecessary for the national firms to retain 
their oligopoly with big business clients but because he saw it as demeaning to a 
professional’s status.   He was not alone in his views.  In his valedictory address in 1937, 
retiring AIA president Robert Montgomery gave a stern warning about a vision of the 
profession that saw more responsibilities for CPA’s: “When I look down upon you from 
my mansion in heaven fifty years from now, I shall be content if I find our profession 
then has the same prestige as it has today…If you have gained the whole world and lost 
your souls, I shall mourn bitterly even though my place in heaven is permanent.  We 
have been told so often that we cannot remain still, we must go forward or backward, 
that we are inclined to believe it.  Nevertheless, I ask the profession to stand still.  I do 
not want it to change”  (The American Institute of Accountants, 1937, p.89-90). 
On the other side was Blough, who in background and philosophy was closer to 
the ASCPA (Miranti, 1990, p.153).  He had grown up in Wisconsin and worked his way 
up through state government before coming to work for the SEC.   It was the ASCPA 
that had made its headquarters in Washington (the AIA was headquartered in New 
York), developing relationships with Congress and the regulatory agencies (Carey, 1969, 
p.354).  As we will see, when Blough became Director of Research for the united AIA, 
he would emphasize the needs of small practitioners over those of the national firms.  In 
contrast to the insular Wall Street elite, Blough, as first chief accountant of the SEC,  
understood the need to propitiate the SEC, Congress, and the investing public in order to 
retain control over the standards CPA’s worked by.  This would involve not only 
sedulous attention to developing accounting theory and standards on issues relating to 
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big business, but also in developing the professionalism of CPA’s working in small, 
local practices.  Blough would play an important role as part of the new generation that 
would lead accounting in the postwar era.  The antiquated nineteenth century British 
gentleman model that disdained formal regulations, looked suspiciously on professionals 
from different backgrounds, and rejected the adversarial relationship between auditor 
and client that the New Dealers envisioned would be pushed aside, not directly by the 
Securities Acts, but by the demands the American marketplace thrust upon it. 
III. The McKesson-Robbins Scandal  
 Before Enron and WorldCom, the most notorious accounting scandal in 
American history was McKesson-Robbins.  The revelation that systematic fraud had 
been perpetrated under the nose of the profession’s premier firm, Price Waterhouse (the 
firm of George O. May), made headlines in newspapers all over the country and led to 
major changes in audit procedures.  It also proved a major blow to the elite generation’s 
control of the profession, both to its prestige and to its numbers, as the practice of 
relying on temporary workers came under greater scrutiny and the ranks of full-time 
CPAs swelled. 
The man at the center of the McKesson-Robbins scandal was Philip Musica.  By 
the time he crossed paths with the auditors at Price Waterhouse, he had twice pled guilty 
to fraud, once in 1909 and again in 1913. By 1923, he had set up a small chemical 
manufacturing concern called Girard and Co., with himself as President, under the name 
Dr. Donald Coster.   As his biographer writes: “Just how much of the thriving little 
company’s business was legitimate was hard to determine even by contemporary 
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records” (Keats, 1964, p.69).  In any case, the business continued to expand, and by 
1925 Coster decided he needed the legitimacy of an audit by the premier American firm, 
Price Waterhouse.  PW did no background check on Girard or Coster before agreeing to 
take the engagement (SEC, 1940, p.146). From this point until the scandal was revealed 
in 1939, PW would annually issue clean audit opinions on Coster’s businesses.  
Coster had the idea to form a national drug wholesale distributorship, and for this 
purpose convinced investors that Girard and Co. should buy up various drug wholesale 
concerns.  In October, 1927, he issued a prospectus proposing a merger of Girard & Co. 
with McKesson-Robbins (SEC, 1940, p.28).  By 1927, more than $1 million in stock had 
been sold in the new company. 
Before the Securities Acts, there was no requirement that publicly traded 
companies undergo audits, although it was common to do so, and the exact scope of the 
audit was largely a private arrangement between management and the auditor.  The SEC 
report on the McKesson-Robbins scandal includes the initial engagement letter Coster 
sent to PW, in which he emphasizes that the auditors should confine themselves to 
checking the employees, not the management, of McKesson-Robbins.   This is perhaps 
the clearest evidence available of the position auditors found themselves in before 
regulations required audits: they were at the mercy of management, and had little real 
independence in how they conducted their work.  A client could simply dismiss an audit 
firm that challenged its accounting and hire a more pliant one, as this comment from a 
Price Waterhouse partner suggests: “McKesson and Robbins, Inc. has become a large 
organization, and we consider the connection of sufficient importance to warrant our 
74 
 
making every effort to clear up without delay any sore spots which may develop among 
the executives” (SEC, 1940, p. 172). 
Coster had learned from his Girard experience how to mislead his auditors.  As a 
book he kept on his desk explained: “It is the nationwide custom of banks and 
corporations to submit annual reports and financial statements, examined and approved 
by certified public accountants.  Upon these sworn certificates, stockholders rely and 
investors base their judgment...The truth which the public has never been told is that no 
practical system has ever been devised by which the complicated finances of a large 
institution can be thoroughly checked up so that every transaction is verified, except at 
prohibitive time and cost” (Keats, 1964, p.120). At Girard, Coster had simply created 
fraudulent documents that the auditors accepted as inventory records.   Over the next 
several years, as Price Waterhouse regularly issued clean audit opinions of McKesson-
Robbins, Coster and his three brothers, who all held executive positions in the firm, 
continued to manufacture documents relating to inventory and accounts receivable 
records.  Price Waterhouse, following standard but not best practices within the industry, 
confined its audit to a check of the records, not the actual inventory.  Nor did PW 
directly contact any of McKesson Robbins debtors regarding the accounts receivable 
(AICPA Archives, statement by AIA 3/4/39). 
Reading the SEC’s exhaustive report today, the reader is struck by the parallels 
to the Enron scandal.  Like Enron, there were abundant warning signs of trouble.  
George O. May would lament: “The distress that I naturally feel about the whole affair 
[is]to think that we had a glorious opportunity to discover a great fraud and failed to 
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make the most of it” (May Papers, 69-3, 1939).  In a footnote of the SEC Report, PW 
makes clear it was aware of potential problems in a letter to McKesson Robbins: “In 
submitting the December 31, 1932 financial statements which we have sent you to date, 
we have called your attention, in the case of a number of companies, to the fact that there 
is not an adequate system of internal check to protect them against irregularities and 
misappropriation of funds” (SEC, 1940, p.154). 
The fraud itself was finally exposed in December, 1938, when Julian Thompson, 
Coster’s top assistant, confronted Coster with his suspicions that the Canadian 
warehouse of McKesson Robbins did not, in fact, exist.  In a complex effort to shield the 
company from investigation, Coster had the firm put into receivership, which raised 
alarm bells through Wall Street and led to the SEC investigation and exposure of the 
fraud.  Coster, a.k.a. Philip Musica, committed suicide (Keats, 1964,  p. 172-5). 
On the night of Sunday, December 4, 1938, when word of the fraud spread 
through Wall Street, a hurried meeting was called by Sidney Weinburg, a Governor of 
the NYSE who also sat on the Board of Directors of McKesson Robbins.  Among the 
people he rousted out of bed that night was George O. May, as the senior partner of Price 
Waterhouse in New York City.   
   The case was sensationally covered in the New York Times and elsewhere. 
May’s humiliation as the scandal was made clear can only be guessed at.   A man whose 
personal integrity was beyond reproach, long retired from active work in audits and now 
an elder statesman of the profession, had to explain how his own firm had been 
unwittingly complicit in a fraud that had been going on for fourteen years.   This is all 
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made painfully clear in a correspondence between May and J.M.B. Hoxsey in the wake 
of the McKesson-Robbins scandal.   It will be recalled that Hoxsey was May’s chief 
contact at the NYSE when Audits of Corporate Accounts was prepared.  The two had 
been applauded in the press as partners in this effort (May Papers, 61-9, 1931). Now, an 
obviously anguished Hoxsey writes May: “I feel now that I advised the Stock Exchange 
badly in 1932 and 1933…it simply did not occur to me to doubt that inventories and 
receivables were spot checked” (May papers, 69-3, 1939).  As late as the 1950s, May 
would refuse to write an article on McKesson Robbins for the Journal of Accountancy 
and his extensive correspondence includes only a few curt references to the scandal. 
Hoxsey’s regret would seem to validate the concerns that many inside and 
outside the profession had expressed since Main Street and Wall Street.  As I discussed, 
most historians have followed the view of James Landis that the audit profession at the 
time of the New Deal had not obtained the level of professionalism needed in order to 
carry out the responsibilities granted to it under the Securities Acts.  The McKesson case 
raised concerns that this remained true in 1939.  Following generally accepted 
procedures, Price Waterhouse had been duped over a period of 14 years.  It did not 
confirm receivables or inventory by physical inspection, and relied on temporary 
workers and poorly trained accountants who did not understand the business they were 
auditing.    
The scandal offers a window into how the profession’s public relations skills had 
developed since the New Deal years.  Unprecedented pressure was placed on the 
profession to revamp its audit procedures; within a month of the public revelation of the 
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scandal the Attorney General of New York summoned leaders of the AIA to his office to 
discuss what reforms were needed, and his office issued a statement that “The Coster-
Musica case [has] revealed certain fundamental weaknesses in the preparation of 
financial statements of large corporations” (NYT 12/24/38 p.4).  The new chairman of 
the SEC, Jerome Frank, hoped the fallout from McKesson-Robbins would mark “a 
turning point in accounting standards” and called on accountants to take the lessons of 
the scandal to heart and begin to accept the responsibilities the New Dealers had laid out 
for them seven years before:  “Without in any way indicating what the applicable law 
and morals may have been in the past, I suggest that the McKesson-Robbins 
case…raises, for the future, certain questions with respect to corporations whose 
securities are listed or registered.  While the controller serves not only the management 
but also the stockholders, should not the accountant serve the management and the 
stockholders and the bondholders and other creditors?  And should not the accountant 
serve not merely the existing stockholders and bondholders, but all future investors?” 
(NYT 1/9/39 p.45). 
All this unwanted public scrutiny startled the profession and led to a quick 
response: by May of 1939, six months after the scandal broke, new procedures were put 
in place requiring physical checking of inventory and confirmation of receivables.   
Many counted the profession lucky to have avoided a government takeover of the setting 
of accounting standards (May Papers, 56-10, 1959; “McKesson-Robbins”, 1941, p.1).  A 
new tone could be detected in response to the SEC’s investigation in the scandal: “Such 
an investigation might not be proper in the case of any other profession, but certified 
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public accountants recognize a dual responsibility which is unique – a responsibility to 
the client and a responsibility to the public which may rely upon the accountant’s report.  
It was no doubt in the belief that the investing public, as represented by the S.E.C., had a 
right to know all it wanted to know about generally accepted auditing procedure that the 
accounting profession cooperated fully in providing the desired information” 
(“McKesson-Robbins”, 1941, p.1). 
But not everyone had gotten the message that a new, humbler tone was the order 
of the day.  The haughtiness that so annoyed James Landis was still in evidence in 
comments like this from T.C. Andrews of the AIA: “It is offensive to members of the 
profession to suggest that the work of developing its technical and professional standards 
should be taken from the hands of the profession itself and be assumed by a department 
of the federal government” (NYT, 4/23/40, p.35). 
Besides making at least many in the profession more aware of the power of 
public opinion, McKesson-Robbins offered an opening to the smaller firms that desired a 
greater say in the profession.  At a meeting with members of New York Governor 
Lehman’s staff, the New York Times reported: “A number of [speakers] charged that 
about 90 per cent of all the brokerage and investment firms, as well as the greatest 
industrial firms listed on the Stock and Curb Exchanges, were audited by six or seven 
great firms of which Price, Waterhouse, and Co., auditors of the McKesson-Robbins 
company, was one.  With this was coupled a charge that the officials of these firms 
dominated the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants and the 
American Institute of Accountants which resulted in a too lenient interpretation by the 
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Association of principles which should be applied to all accountancy activity.  Speakers 
declared that where small accounting firms, auditing smaller business houses, made it an 
almost invariable practice to check on statements of inventories and of accounts 
receivable before listing them in audit, the larger accounting firms, dealing with the 
books and records of the larger houses, in general accepted the statements of officers of 
the companies audited and put them into balance sheets without further checks” (NYT 
1/7/39, p.11). 
Remarkably, the profession was allowed to implement its own reforms after 
McKesson-Robbins.  The new audit rules regarding physical inspection of inventory and 
confirmation of receivables satisfied the SEC, and the profession retained control of 
setting accounting standards.  This must be seen as the final coronation by the federal 
government of the accounting profession’s power to police itself: even in the wake of 
this scandal, the SEC refused to reconsider its decision in the early 1930s to leave 
accounting to the accountants. 
The use of temporary workers had also come under sharp criticism in the SEC’s 
report, spurring a revamping of staffing by the major firms that would have far-reaching 
consequences.  Accounting’s elite had held on to the reins of power through control of 
the large, national firms.  Relying on temporary workers for the largest audits left a 
relatively small number of partners at the top of these firms.  After McKesson Robbins, 
the practice of using these largely untrained workers fell into disrepute, and the large 
firms were forced to employ more full time accountants, all of whom would become 
CPAs and be eligible for partnership and a voice in management.    
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The profession had survived intact, but the weaknesses in the old guard 
leadership had been exposed, and the scandal brought new opportunities to the forces 
that would challenge this leadership.  
  
IV.  The Profession in World War II 
The mobilization of the American economy for war placed unprecedented 
demands on the accounting profession.  Both the draft and the increased needs of 
government agencies shrank the number of accountants available for the continuing 
needs of American business.  New responsibilities and new entrants into the profession - 
particularly, for the first time, women – expanded the profession’s reach while 
simultaneously reshaping its membership, preparing accounting for the postwar 
expansion that would democratize the profession and prepare it to take its proper place 
in American society.   
A shortage of trained accountants confronted the profession quickly after Pearl 
Harbor.   By December 1942, public accounting firms had lost from one-third to one-
half of their pre-war staffs (NYT, 12/18/42, p.43).   Along with the draft, this shortage 
came from the massive enlisting of accountants for work in government agencies.   A 
unified and, in the wake of McKesson-Robbins, perhaps chastened profession responded 
with a new alacrity, as the New York Times told its readers: “Recognizing that 
accounting has become an indispensable element in war production and in control of the 
government’s vast expenditures, the executive committee of the American Institute of 
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Accountants yesterday announced adoption of a war activities program to remain in 
effect for the duration” (NYT, 11/10/42, p.41).  As quickly as January 1942 practitioner 
journals were advising their readers of the new issues their clients would be facing, from 
contingencies in the face of uncertain payment from government funds to questions as to 
whether “accounting reports may be of value to enemy forces,” and whether subsidiaries 
of clients now in enemy hands could still be listed as assets on their balance sheets.  
(Towns, 1942a, p.270).   
Wartime demands put strains on all aspects of the American economy not 
engaged in war production, and the work of auditors was no different.   Partly in 
response to requests from accounting firms, the New York Stock Exchange extended the 
filing period for annual reports, and in an ironic decision, the stricter requirements for 
the physical inspection of inventories, put in place after the McKesson-Robbins scandal, 
were suspended.  (NYT 12/18/42 p.43, Towns, 1942a, p.372).   
Government agencies frequently turned to the large accounting firms when the 
scale of war contracts became overwhelming.   Accountants found themselves 
responsible for audits by the War and Navy Departments, allocation of critical materials 
by the War Productions Board, and financial reporting under price fixing programs.    An 
estimated 10,000 accountants were hired by the Army alone to audit war contracts 
(Towns, 1942a, p.372). Financial reporting issues specific to the war effort were the 
subject of a great deal of professional literature.  Contingent liabilities involving the 
uncertain collection of government payment for war contracts had been handled with 
footnote disclosures through 1942, when “some companies met with rude surprises in 
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the effect which actual settlements had on that year’s operating results.” (Donald P. 
Perry, 1944, p.137).   As factories around the country began running overtime to meet 
the demand for war materials, accountants had to make new accelerated depreciation 
estimates, an issue that was made particularly vexing since no one knew how long the 
war would last (Towns, 1942a, p.373). 
Perhaps the most prominent impact of the war on the work of accountants was 
the substantial increase in personal income taxes and new excess profits taxes.  Taxes 
before the war had affected a maximum of 6% of the population (Zelizer, 1998, p.84).   
The increased complexity and scope of the tax code gave birth to a swelling of the ranks 
of tax accountants that would continue in the postwar era as tax rates remained high. 
(Towns, 1942a, p.374, Perry, 1944, p.139). 
Like all other professions, accountants had to negotiate with Selective Service 
officials to keep as many trained accountants as possible working on corporate 
engagements.  CPAs were early on designated an essential occupation, however “no 
employer should hope for occupational deferment of any able-bodied accountant under 
26 years of age, regardless or dependents or professional skill” (“The Manpower 
Problem”, 1944, p.65).   Professional exemptions were often unevenly enforced by local 
draft boards, and it was necessary to show that the client’s work, and the outside 
auditor’s contribution to it, were essential to the war effort  (Higgens, 1965, p.192).  In 
practice, accounting firms were frequently frustrated in their efforts to retain key 
employees (Carey, 1970, p.47). 
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For all the challenges the profession had to confront in these years, the war 
proved a tremendous boon for the profession.  Among other things, the unprecedented 
scale of war contracts led to innovations in business management and recordkeeping.  
“There is no doubt but that WPB and OPA have forced many businesses to develop 
more adequate records” (“War Has Changed Old Bookkeeping”,1944, p.273).   To 
implement machine recordkeeping such as punch-card systems, the large accounting 
firms were often brought in as consultants (Higgens, 1965, p.188).   As one writer 
summarized it, “Prior to the war, the average accounting practice was largely composed 
of audit work and preparation of tax returns, sweetened on occasion by nonrecurring 
system engagements or cases dealing with new financing. The scope of services 
rendered by accountants has been considerably extended in wartime, and it seems 
probable that the success of the profession in handling these varied assignments may 
result in a wider field of practice in the future.  The problems of business management 
have been tremendously complicated by the network of wartime controls in the face of 
expanding volume, and shortage of managerial manpower has led many clients to turn to 
professional accountants for assistance” (Perry, 1944, p.139). 
Perhaps the most profound change the war brought to accounting was the 
massive influx of new people brought into the profession due to manpower shortages.  
As with the ending of the practice of relying on temporary workers in the wake of the 
McKesson-Robbins scandal, the demands of the war further diluted the elite’s control 
over the profession.  Most prominently, women entered the ranks of accounting in large 
numbers for the first time.  Prior to the war, accounting was considered “the most 
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difficult of all the professions for women to break into,” and women encountered 
engrained prejudice from accounting professors who discouraged them from even 
studying accounting, to clients reluctant to take the advice of female auditors, to the 
accounting firm partner who proclaimed he would “go out of business before he would 
employ a woman on his staff.”  But by 1943, 8.4% of the accounting workforce was 
female and the long-term expansion of the profession would require a continuation of 
this trend.  A shortage of trained accountants had existed even before the war, and the 
expansion of client services, in part a result of wartime needs, meant that accounting had 
to change with the times.  The war brought a virtual sea-change in attitude towards the 
employment of women, with one university official writing: “The field is definitely a 
growing one for women, at least while the war lasts.  By peacetime women will have 
proved themselves capable and will never again be discarded in accounting firms.” As 
one Jennie Palen proudly concluded in the Journal of Accountancy in July, 1945: “It is 
the testimony of those who are now employing women accountants [that gives reason to 
be hopeful of women’s prospects in accounting].  These men, partners in the larger 
accounting firms, all leaders in accounting though and men in the forefront of 
accountancy’s activities, have given, with heart-warming frankness and sincerity, an 
overwhelming endorsement of the woman accountant and a promise for her future.  A 
cross section of these opinions, solicited in March, 1945, presents unimpeachable 
testimony that women on public accountants’ staffs have been highly satisfactory, that 
clients have not objected to them, that the seniors whom they were assigned to liked 
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them, that they are to be kept on after the war, and that they will be advanced in rating as 
they merit such advancement” (Palen, 1945, p.27). 
V.  Postwar Expansion and the New AICPA 
 CPAs often spoke during the war of the patriotic service they had contributed by 
working on government contracts to keep the Arsenal of Democracy running at full 
speed.  With the end of the war, the profession found itself with newfound respect 
(Carey, 1970, p.53).  The expansion of the profession’s ranks would continue in the 
postwar era, a consequence both of the economic boom and of accountants broadening 
their reach to become accepted as experts in expanding fields like taxation and 
management advisory services.  Perhaps most significantly, the leadership of the 
profession would pass from the old guard of the 1920s and New Deal era to a new 
generation.  Men like Carman Blough and John Carey would aggressively pursue a 
strategy that raised accounting’s profile and extended its reach, determined to make 
accounting a premier American profession, worthy of a place alongside law and 
medicine.  By the early 1960s they had largely succeeded.   
The size and complexity of the American economy and government reached 
unprecedented scales in the postwar era.   Big business had reaped most of the gains 
from government contracts during the war, and now had huge retained profits with 
which to expand  (Sobel, 1975, p.139).   The war had also spurred innovations in the use 
of automated equipment in business.  All of this required more accountants to audit, 
track costs, and advise their corporate clients.  High tax rates to pay for the war effort 
and to keep inflation under control were largely kept in place after the war, and the era 
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of ever-expanding tax deductions to encourage desirable behavior like stock investing 
and R&D created a huge demand for tax accountants  (Bruchey, 1990, p.490).  
Government spending also grew in this era, largely in defense expenditures, creating 
another niche for accountants as government adopted the latest methods of cost tracking 
(Patterson, 1996, p.64).   
Americans continued to prefer private regulation and market forces to the heavy 
hand of government oversight of the economy.  With the exception of a handful of anti-
trust suits, big business continued to flourish and even increase its dominance of the 
corporate landscape.  The Wagner Act of 1933 had codified labor’s right to collective 
bargaining, and powerful unions now jostled with management over wages and benefits.  
Despite the generally popular expansion of government under the New Deal, the 
uniquely American “private welfare state” of employer-sponsored pensions and health 
care continued to expand in the postwar era (Zelizer, 1998,  p.5). 
The stock market spent twenty years in the doldrums after the 1929 crash.  Even 
as business reaped huge profits from wartime contracts, stocks continued to lag: “The 
Great Depression produced a generation of Americans who no longer believed in 
purchasing stocks” (Sobel, 1975, p.74).  But the unprecedented prosperity of the postwar 
era finally produced a bull market beginning in 1952.  For the rest of the decade, as long 
as business expanded and stocks continued to climb, there was little pressure for 
additional regulation.  These years are often described as a low point for the SEC, which 
saw its staff and prestige sharply reduced from the heyday of the 1930s (Sobel, 1975, 
p.156).  
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Given this atmosphere, it is commendable that the accounting profession 
continued along the path of developing its professionalism.  Carman Blough was among 
the leaders in this effort.  He became Director of Research for the AIA in 1948.   Blough 
would continue to prod accountants to adopt more uniform procedures for audits and 
financial statement preparation, as he had done in the 1930s as Chief Accountant of the 
SEC (Carey, 1970,  p.156).  He did this with speeches and a regular column in the 
Journal of Accountancy, “Carman Blough’s Accounting and Auditing,” where he 
clarified technical accounting issues and encouraged the use of best practices.   
John Carey, now Executive Director of the AIA, became the profession’s 
cheerleader.  Through importuning, self-conscious editorials in the Journal of 
Accountancy, he encouraged a sense of pride that challenged members to embrace the 
“Social Responsibilities of CPAs” and constantly congratulated them on their progress: 
“Such rapid growth might have resulted in disorganization…on the contrary, 
professional organization has improved…A vast amount of work remains to be done 
before the CPA will be universally accepted as the equal of his colleagues in the older 
professions, [but] for the first time, it seems to us, it may be said that the rough 
framework at least has been completed…to complete the structure of the accounting 
profession” (“Social Responsibilities of CPAs”, 1954, p.33).  Appearing before 
Congressional committees as expert witnesses was one avenue towards raising the 
profession’s status.  CPAs had begun working with Congress more frequently during 
World War II doing auditing and cost-tracking work on government war contracts.  In 
the postwar years, the federal government increasingly looked to accountants to bring 
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modern accounting techniques to bureaucracies like the ICC, advocating the use of 
depreciation accounting and statistical sampling techniques among many other 
innovations.  Accountants would now regularly begin their testimony by identifying 
themselves as representing the AIA, “the largest national organization of CPAs”, and 
presenting the Institute as including a broad swath of practicing CPAs in the U.S. This 
stands in contrast to Col. Carter’s 1933 testimony on the Securities Acts, where he 
claimed only to be speaking as President of the NYSSCPA. 
The increasing complexity and ubiquity of taxes were a boon to the accounting 
profession.  High progressive tax rates combined with numerous tax deductions to 
encourage socially desirable behavior (e.g. home-ownership, donations to charity) 
“transform[ed] taxation into a central component of economic and social policy” 
(Zelizer, 1998, p.27). From 1939 to 1944, the number of Americans paying federal 
income taxes increased from 4 million to 44 million (Zelizer, 1998, p.85). These tax 
rates were kept in place by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to fund the military 
during the Cold War.  The ability of the American profession to carve out tax practice 
for CPAs (as opposed to lawyers, who largely disdained this work in the 1920s) 
probably did more to identify accountants as professionals in the public mind than even 
the Securities Acts.  An entire profession of tax accountants, whose work had little 
substantive connection to that of the auditor, fell under the umbrella of the American 
accounting profession.  The AIA now regularly advised Congress on tax policy.  The 
work of tax accountants, economists, and lawyers as advisors to government “also 
helped to promote into Congress a new type of political elite to represent the public 
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interest.  Until the 1940s, two organizations had secured the right to claim that they 
represented the citizen within the tax policymaking process: interest groups and political 
parties.  Economic experts still had limited access to the congressional leadership despite 
their gains within the executive branch” (Zelizer, 1998, p. 82)  The improved standing of 
the accounting profession was noted by Congressman Wilbur Mills, chairman of the 
House Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation: “The American Institute of 
Accountants has rendered a valuable public service in the attitude that the organization 
has taken with respect to improvement of our tax laws, pointing out those things that 
operate adversely against both government and taxpayers…Sometimes we do not always 
agree with you, but we have some reluctance to state the fact that we do not agree with 
you because of your fine reputation” (AICPA, 1957, p.13).   
The drive to improve the profession’s standing and consolidate the AIA’s power 
as the sole voice of CPA’s was driven mostly by the needs of small practitioners.  In the 
nineteenth century, it had been elite practitioners from the leading firms who had 
encouraged unity in order to promote their agenda of passing licensing laws and setting 
minimum standards for CPAs.  Local practitioners developed their own client base and 
saw no need to concede to state and national organizations the right to determine how 
their practice was conducted. It was partly this disdain for the national organizations by 
small practitioners that hindered efforts at national unity until the New Deal (Carey, 
1970, p.345-9).  By the 1950’s, however, the small accounting firm increasingly faced 
challenges requiring an authoritative and representative voice.  An ever expanding set of 
accounting standards as well as increased automation and cost-tracking techniques 
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placed more demands on CPAs.   Carman Blough’s column of technical advice and John 
Carey’s exhortative columns all were geared to providing guidance to the small firm.  
 The larger, national firms had by the 1950s sufficient resources to conduct their 
own research and provide technical guidance to their employees.  In addition, the work 
of the national firms dealt with auditing and consulting for the industrial giants of 
national and increasingly international scope who were publicly traded on the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges.  A merger wave hit the accounting profession in 
response to the increased scale of international business.  “Big 8 accounting firms had to 
adapt to the internationalization of American business” (Wootton and Wouk, 1992, p.2).  
This expansion of the national accounting firms reached into the small practitioners’ 
domain as well.  National businesses increasingly kept branch offices in smaller markets, 
and local business wishing to expand also needed national accounting firms to handle 
their business.  Local accounting firms often could not offer continuity of service, as 
partners could not always train and retain partners to continue serving clients upon the 
partner’s retirement.  The national accounting firms could also offer advisory services 
for expanding business that the smaller firms could not (Wootton et al. 2003, p.34).   
Small practitioners particularly resented the poaching of their clients by Big 8 
firms when these companies expanded to a national scale and made their first public 
stock offering.  One observer noted: “The local firms face a continuing succession of 
tragedies as the small and medium-sized companies they have grown up with locally 
grow too big for them” (Wise, 1960, p.192).  There was even a movement to ban the 
published research being done by Big 8 firms, out of concern that it was burnishing the 
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national firms’ reputations at their expense.  The efforts to strengthen the AICPA as a 
small-practitioner focused organization included a desire to help local CPAs become 
more competitive with national firms (Wise, 1960, p. 193).    
The AIA’s focus then, turned away from the increasingly independent national 
firms and towards the needs of the small practitioners.  For while the national firms 
expanded to smaller markets and to the international stage, smaller firms were growing 
at an even faster rate.  “From 1946 to 1966 the number of CPA’s associated with the ten 
largest firms had jumped from 2,950 to 11,850 -  a 401% increase.  However, the total 
number of CPA’s had jumped from 20,778 to 94,284 during the same period – a 453% 
increase” (Carey, 1970, p.356).   Several of the presidents of the AIA (after 1957 the 
AICPA) had backgrounds in local firms, including Robert Witschey (1951), Marquis 
Eaton(1957), and Clifford Heimbucher (1963).   
As the AIA reoriented its mission towards the needs of the small practitioners, it 
transformed itself into a truly national organization that took responsibility for the 
standards by which all CPAs worked.   The success of their efforts to truly represent the 
profession were paying off: immediately after the 1937 merger, 4,900 out of 16,500 
CPAs in the United States belonged to the AIA  (30%); by 1958 31,000 of 56,000 were 
AICPA members (55%) (Carey, 1969, p.370 , U.S. Congress, 1958B, p.1439). 
Among the top of small practitioners’ agenda was the encroachment of 
unlicensed public accountants into CPAs’ territory.    In the postwar era, CPAs were 
almost universally college graduates and had passed a now nationally standardized and 
notoriously rigorous examination process.  PA’s competed only in local markets, and so 
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posed little threat to the Big 8 firms.  But for small practitioner CPA’s, unlicensed public 
accountants were interlopers who threatened their hard-won status and thwarted goals of 
professional unity.  The AIA’s official policy was to encourage public accountants to 
obtain the educational and statutory requirements of CPAs, something the PA’s, not 
surprisingly, resisted as pointless, bureaucratic hoop-jumping.  Although public 
accountants had their own state and nationwide organizations, anyone could call 
themselves a public accountant.  CPAs major concern was that unethical or untrained 
individuals holding themselves out as public accountants would damage the reputation 
of the accounting profession.  In a sign that the national organization was moving 
towards the concerns of small practitioners, it was only in 1957 that the AIA changed its 
name to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a step explicitly 
intended to distinguish the licensed public accountant  (AICPA, 1957, p.1).  
The Institute’s new focus did not win universal acclaim in the accounting 
community.  George O. May, now in his third decade of retirement, maintained a 
vigorous and often cantankerous correspondence with AICPA officials.  At times his 
letters resemble the angry missives that fill the Letters to the Editor section of local 
newspapers, but they also reflect the generational fault lines that symbolize the 
profession’s development in these years.  May’s career, from the 1890s through the New 
Deal, had witnessed the acceptance of the CPA’s role as a watchdog of American capital 
markets, an effort that he as much as any individual was responsible for.  Through the 
1950s until his death in 1962, he worked on complex accounting issues relevant to the 
auditing and financial statement preparation for the largest American corporations.  His 
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narrow view of the profession suggests a man who could not see beyond his own 
experience.  From resisting James Landis’ efforts to establish legal liability to opposing 
the AICPA’s focus on the needs of small practitioners, he remained a thorn in the side of 
those who would make accounting a modern profession.  
“I deeply regret the appointment of an expert in publicity [John Carey] as editor 
of the Journal [of Accountancy],” May writes to Carman Blough.  “It seems to me to be 
an acceptance of the view that the function of that Journal is to promote the interests of 
accountants rather than to give accountants professional guidance” (May papers, 58-10, 
1956).  To John Inglis of Price Waterhouse he continues: “I think it is high time 
somebody protested against Carey’s monopolistic rule in the Institute…Obviously, 
neither a real profession nor a real professional man should either advertise or be a 
competitor” (May papers, 58-10, 1956).   
Blough, who had been advocating his vision of the profession against May since 
his tenure at the SEC in the 1930s, is also a focus of May’s displeasure: “Carman Blough 
is a tired man who has lost a large part of his earlier efficiency…I wish I could share the 
view that [he] has rendered the Institute a great service as its Director of Research” (May 
papers, 57-1, 1957).  It is expressly the focus on small practitioners that May takes issue 
with: “There is in the research organization neither the will nor the ability to face the 
problems presented which have to do primarily with the large corporations.  This is not 
surprising, since the membership of those committees is drawn mainly from accountants 
who have no participation in the auditing of these corporations” (May papers, 57-1, 
1957).  He concludes: “I like Carman personally and have deep sympathy for him.  I 
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think he has rendered a very useful service to small practitioners by his discussion of the 
everyday problems that arise” (May papers, 57-1, 1957).  But he saw such efforts as 
cheapening the profession he had helped to build, and degrading the relative value of his 
work on sophisticated accounting procedures that were largely irrelevant to local 
practitioners. 
Another target of his criticism was the trend among accounting firms to offer 
their services in the expanding field of management advisory services, or consulting.  
This work was seen by many as a means of enhancing the CPA’s prestige as a “man of 
business”, as well as a more profitable line of work than the financial statement audit.  
Although the Big 8 firms pioneered MAS work in the 1950s, local practitioners also took 
to it, encouraged by the AICPA.  May saw consulting work as a serious conflict of 
interest and a diminution of the CPA’s role as an independent auditor.  Referring to 
AICPA President Marquis Eaton’s promotion of MAS work, May wrote in a private 
memo: “In what sense is management advisory service on a higher level than that 
rendered by the independent accountant on the accounts of a corporation?  Mr. Eaton’s 
answer to this question is clear: that the service is on a higher level of profitability” 
(May papers, 68-10, 1959).  On this issue, at least, May’s concerns were proved right.   
Over the course of the next several decades, consulting work drew a steadily larger share 
of firms’ revenue, to the point where many feared that dependence on consulting fees 
rendered CPA’s unable to stand up to their clients on questionable audit practices.  This 
conflict is generally viewed as being the root cause of Arthur Andersen’s complicity in 
the Enron scandal. 
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Perhaps the most revealing statement among May’s papers is an undated “Precis 
for Talk with Mr. John L. Carey” from 1956.  Here, May explicitly rejects the notion 
that accounting is truly a profession at all:  “In what sense is accounting now or likely to 
be in the future, a profession?  Accounting as a calling or a profession is an outgrowth of 
the corporate system.  It is concerned with problems of finance, not of personal well-
being.  It would seem to follow that it is not a profession in the sense in which the word 
was used 200 years ago.  Can it be said to be a profession, entrants to which should have 
a sense of mission?  It is surely not a profession the entrants to which commonly have a 
sense of mission.  The decision to enter it is, I should suppose, generally as it was in my 
own case, based on a belief that it is a field in which the ability the entrant possesses 
could most profitably and not uncongenially be employed…Recognition by the state did 
not bring with it any such broad privileged status as the bar enjoys.  There is little 
incentive to acquire the status of a CPA with a view to entry into any other than an 
accounting field of activity.  There is such an incentive to acquire the privileged status of 
a lawyer” (May papers, 56-10, 1959).  These overwrought (and patently untrue) 
comments suggest a man flailing for arrows to dart at his enemies.  May had come to 
accounting from a patrician background in England.  He had been slated to attend 
Cambridge before being persuaded to enter accountancy, “the rising profession” as he 
remembered it (Grady, 1962, p.9).  He had risen in the profession through an 
apprenticeship typical of the English system, and quite in contrast to the more 
“democratic” system of university education as the path to professionalism that was 
common in the United States (Bleidstein, 1978, p.33).  The profession’s expanding 
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numbers, increasing reliance on formal standards rather than professional judgment, and 
finally in the postwar era its focus on the rather mundane needs of the small practitioner, 
all seemed to threaten the elegant “art” of accountancy that he exemplified ( see the 
dedication in Grady, 1962.)  His own vision of the profession should not be minimized.  
He wrote that the work of the CPA “presents one high obligation: a duty to the unknown 
investor that is superior to the obligation to the immediate client” (May papers, 56-10, 
1959).  He frequently recounted with pride his public service as a government consultant 
during World War I.   But the CPA of the 1950s and beyond, who engaged in public 
relations, advertising, and lobbying, was anathema to his model, and something he 
would continue to fight right up to his death in 1961 at the age of 86.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE UNION CORRUPTION SCANDALS, 1957-1962 
The evolution that was taking place in the profession’s leadership can be most 
clearly illustrated by looking at the AICPA’s involvement in the union corruption 
scandals of the late 1950s.  What follows is an analysis of that episode.  
The AICPA was now firmly in the grip of men who wanted a greater public 
profile for the profession.  The scandals of labor union corruption in the late 1950s 
offered a forum to announce to the world that “The Auditors Have Arrived”, as a profile 
of the profession in Fortune proclaimed.  Abandoning an earlier policy of quietly 
existing above the fray of Washington politics, the AICPA began lobbying in favor of 
vast expansions of the audit franchise in the field of trade unions and pensions, and to 
speak confidently of the CPA as business consultant.   They did this because they felt 
compelled by the public attention on the issue of financial improprieties in unions to 
assert their expertise, not realizing that their long years of avoiding Washington politics 
left them poorly prepared for this role. Their efforts in the union corruption scandals 
would be unsuccessful, but the process opened the profession’s eyes to the importance of 
lobbying, and by the mid-1960’s the AICPA would be much better positioned to assert 
its place as a premier American profession. 
 This new aggressiveness in outlook manifested itself first in the well-publicized 
union corruption scandals. In 1955 a special Senate Subcommittee, known as the 
McClellan Committee after its chair, John McClellan (D-Arkansas), began hearings 
investigating corruption in trade unions.  These hearings, best remembered today for the 
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exchanges between Senate counsel Robert Kennedy and frequent witness Jimmy Hoffa, 
exposed intimidation, violence, and corruption in the handling of union funds.  The 
hearings showed that a lack of proper financial controls played a role in the corruption:  
bookkeeping was erratic or nonexistent, union funds were embezzled by bosses, and 
fraudulent financial statements were presented to the rank-and-file. (Hutchinson, 1970, 
Kennedy, 1960). 
 Accounting at this time was one of the nation’s fastest growing professions. The 
number of CPAs in the U.S. had grown from 20,000 in 1940 to 75,000 in 1962, and 
auditors expected to be “inundated” by even more new business over the course of the 
1960s (U.S. Congress, 1962, p.114; Wise, 1960, p.198).  But the profession remained 
largely in the shadows: from 1955-65, the Wall Street Journal’s annual index had an 
average of 14 articles under the subject “accounting”; the New York Times averaged 12.   
   The union corruption scandals created a sudden demand for stricter financial 
controls over unions and pensions.  The profession’s public image, and in time its 
jurisdiction as the guardians of financial propriety, could be jeopardized if they did not 
act aggressively to show the role they could play in reforming unions and pensions.  
Before the union corruption scandals they had been reluctant to take on new audit clients 
outside their traditional purviews of Wall Street and Main Street (Miranti, 1990, p.120).  
But the public uproar over the union scandals convinced the AICPA it was time for a 
new approach.  In addition, unlicensed public accountants also began lobbying for this 
work, and the AICPA wished to counter this by stating that only licensed CPAs (who 
had passed the formal CPA exam) could be trusted with auditing tasks (below).  
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With this in mind, the AICPA decided to involve itself in the debate over labor 
reform.   Their 1958 Annual Report articulated their new position: “The public interest is 
served by the federal government’s encouragement of independent audits by competent 
and responsible professional accountants of (a) private institutions or public agencies 
independent of the federal government which are utilizing federal funds, and (b) of 
private institutions which are obliged to submit financial reports for federal regulatory 
purposes,”(AICPA, 1958,  p.11).  Carman Blough, Director of Research for the AICPA, 
elaborated on this in testimony before Congress in 1959: “The institute is not a frequent 
witness before Congress…It has been the policy of our institute up until last year not to 
make this type of representation before Congress on the basis that, if we appeared on 
bills of this kind, it would be taken that we were self-serving in our appearance, that the 
purpose we had in mind was to get more work for CPAs.  For that reason, we were very 
reluctant, for years, to make any presentations of this type.  But about a year ago our 
executive committee reached the conclusion that this was not a sound policy, that where 
fiscal matters were involved on which we should have specialized knowledge, we should 
make ourselves available for questioning and should make representations, as I have 
here today, on matters in which we feel we have particular abilities” (U.S. Congress, 
1959a, pp.979, 985). To help foster a closer relationship with the federal government, in 
1959 the AICPA opened a Washington, DC office.  John Carey, the Institute’s Executive 
Director during these years, writes that “it gave the Institute a visibility in the nation’s 
capital which had not existed before,” although he insists “the charge to the Washington 
staff was not to lobby,” (Carey 1970, p.436). 
100 
 
I. Congressional Reform of Unions and Pensions  
In both houses of Congress, several complex bills to regulate unions vied for 
support.  Unable to obtain a consensus around any one comprehensive proposal, and 
eager to show the public it was accomplishing something, Congress in January of 1959 
settled on passing the Welfare and Pension Plans Act, as a prelude to the Landrum-
Griffin Act passed later that year.   Pensions had become a common employee benefit 
after World War II.  These union pensions “provided…a massive new source of 
plunder” for organized crime (Hutchinson, 1970, p.138).  The pension was frequently 
held in a separate trust, but in the extreme cases described in the McClellan hearings, the 
trust was simply a legal fiction (see the story of the United Textile Workers below).  
Discussion prior to the bill’s passage included the possibility of requiring audits for 
pensions. The Eisenhower administration apparently supported an audit requirement 
(Mitchell Papers, Box 180, 1958 F1). A 1956 Senate report explicitly recommended 
annual audits by independent accountants  (U.S. Congress, 1956, p.8).  And Carman 
Blough testified before the Senate in 1957 on behalf of the AICPA.  Here was the 
profession’s first halting attempt at its new strategy.   
Blough’s appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension 
Reform Legislation on June 6, 1957 was consistent with the AICPA’s reluctance to 
lobby.  In very professional and articulate testimony, Blough is most concerned with 
emphasizing that the AICPA is not endorsing the audit proposal, and he is often at pains 
to explain the limits of an audit: “It is important to know that, while many kinds of 
financial data can be audited, there are some kinds which do not lend themselves to 
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verification without going to unreasonable lengths…We do not verify every item.  To do 
so would often be impossible and usually prohibitively expensive…No audit of a fund 
would be likely to disclose such a kickback,” (U.S. Congress, 1957a, pp.164-5).  AICPA 
President Marquis Eaton also sent a telegram on July 27, 1957 to “The White House” 
addressed to “The President” supporting the audit provision.  The reply is a form letter 
addressed to “Mr. Eaton” and supports a conclusion that the AICPA had not cultivated 
relationships with the people making decisions that would impact the audit profession 
(DDE Central Files, General Files, Box 939, 1957).  In the end the pension bill did not 
include an audit requirement, although it did require pensions with more than 25 
participants to file annual reports with the Department of Labor.  Pensions in the United 
States totaled some $30 billion in 1959, covering more than 75 million Americans, 
including workers and their dependents (Lee, 1989, p.75).  
Later that year Congress would move towards comprehensive union reform.  The 
McClellan Committee hearings created a broad public consensus that corruption in 
organized labor needed rooting out.  The American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest federation of trade unions in the United 
States, attempted to head off restrictive legislation by cleaning its own house, expelling 
several unions, including the Teamsters and the United Textile Workers.  The AFL’s 
new regulations included an annual audit by a CPA for all member unions.  The AFL did 
not have the power to enforce an audit requirement on its member unions (and this may 
well explain why it was so quick to give public support for the measure), but its 
endorsement of CPA audits, along with that of the National Association of 
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Manufacturers, gave broad legitimacy to such a proposal (“AFL Code”, 1957, p.51; 
United States Congress, 1959d, p.1711).  In this atmosphere Carman Blough testified 
again, this time before the House Joint Subcommittee on Labor-Management Reform 
Legislation, on May 5, 1959.   
The AICPA by this time had apparently lost its previous reticence.  Testimony on 
pending legislation in prior years had included the qualification “We do not wish to 
make any recommendation as to whether an act of this kind should or should not be 
passed” (U.S. Congress, 1957b, p.164, U.S. Congress, 1958a, p.1439). This time, 
Blough plainly advocates not only an audit requirement but further urges the exclusive 
use of CPAs, as opposed to unlicensed public accountants, for this purpose.  Raymond 
Jennison, Executive Director of the National Society of Public Accountants, had testified 
before the committee two weeks earlier.   Their testimony highlights the long-running 
battle between CPA’s and unlicensed public accountants.  As John Carey describes in 
Chapter 12 of his history, this tension dates from the first CPA licensing law passed in 
New York State in 1896.  As CPA’s consolidated their position through restrictive 
legislation over the course of the twentieth century, public accountants found themselves 
increasingly muscled out of the accounting profession.  By 1945, they had formed their 
own organization, the National Society of Public Accountants, and began to parallel the 
AIA’s (and later AICPA’s) efforts to build a stronger national profile.  On the few 
occasions when CPA’s did testify before Congress, generally on tax and governmental 
accounting issues, the NSPA often made its own appearance, making similar arguments 
but asking Congress not to restrict accounting work to CPAs.  The mutual hostility 
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Carey details spilled over into the labor reform hearings.   Jennison asks that any audit 
requirement not be restricted to CPAs, but allow licensed public accountants as well, 
particularly because “in many small communities they have small locals and actually a 
CPA is often times not available to them.  They would have to travel many miles, and it 
would be a great additional expense,” (U.S. Congress, 1959b, p.827).  He is then 
subjected to difficult questions regarding the exact differences between a CPA and a PA, 
and is forced to concede that, besides not being required to pass the CPA exam, PA’s 
only received licensing from a state board in 28 states as of the date of his testimony.   
Blough’s 1959 testimony is notable not only for the AICPA’s evolution in 
position regarding lobbying but for its glaring lack of preparation.  The congressmen 
were clearly most interested in the cost an audit requirement would impose on unions, 
but Blough was either unprepared or unconcerned on this point.  When a congressman 
asked Blough to “venture a guess or give us an estimate…just approximately” on the 
cost of an audit requirement, Blough avoids giving any sort of substantive answer:  
“That is something on which it would be impossible to make a figure estimate, for this 
reason:  the expense of the audit will vary by the size of the union, the number of its 
transactions, the orderliness of its records, the amount of special investigation that has to 
be entered into in the light of individual transactions that may show up in the course of 
the examination.  So it would be impossible to put a price figure on an audit even if we 
had the size of the individual union before us at the time.” The transcript does not record 
whether any of the congressmen rolled their eyes at being condescended to in this way. 
Later in his testimony, when a congressman speculates that “in a union of 100 it would 
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take a well qualified man at least a month to make a complete audit of expenditures,” 
Blough is after all able to provide some cost parameters, stating: “I would think that in 
the case of a union the size you mention, it would be exaggerating it greatly to say that it 
would take a month to make an examination of that kind of a union.  I would say a few 
days at most would be more likely,” (U.S. Congress, 1959a, pp.983, 986).  
Blough also mistakenly says that he did not testify two years earlier on the 
pension bill, and when asked whether any current laws require a CPA audit, Blough does 
not think to mention the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 (United States Congress, 
1959a, pp.984, 991).  It is worth asking how someone with Blough’s experience could 
turn in such a poor performance.  Blough was, after all, the first Chief Accountant of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission from 1935-38.  But he had left this post some 
twenty years before, and since 1944 had been the AIA’s (later AICPA’s) Director of 
Research.  Throughout the postwar era the profession provided expert testimony on 
taxation and federal government accounting issues on dozens of occasions.  There were 
clearly individuals within the AICPA familiar with providing congressional testimony, 
but Blough apparently never consulted them.  Nor, during the AICPA’s efforts to lobby 
during the summer of 1957 on the pension requirement, is there any evidence that 
Blough and President Eaton consulted on how to present a unified message (above).  The 
most likely explanation for Blough’s testimony is that the AICPA was acting defensively 
on the issue of union and pension audits, responding only as events seemed (in their 
eyes) to dictate.  No clear strategy was ever developed or disseminated through the 
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Institute.   Blough’s testimony was an afterthought, and without sufficient prodding, 
neither he nor anyone else at the AICPA bothered to prepare for his testimony.   
Blough’s new assertiveness on behalf of the profession was not followed up on 
subsequently in the union corruption debate.  The Institute did make a few other half-
hearted efforts on behalf of the audit requirement:  AICPA Executive Director John 
Carey submitted a letter on behalf of the Institute to a Senate subcommittee advocating 
the audit requirement. The Journal’s editorial in the wake of the final passage of the 
Landrum-Griffin Act suggests, just as clearly as Blough’s testimony, how far from the 
political corridors of power the profession’s lobbying efforts were.  They write: “It is a 
little hard to understand why the Congress and the Secretary of Labor have failed to 
adopt a requirement for independent audits”,  like Blough ignoring the congressmens’ 
concerns about the cost of an audit (“Will Union Financial Reports be Adequate?”, 1960, 
p.27). Ultimately the record makes clear that the profession’s efforts had no impact on 
the final bill.  No mention of an audit requirement appears in the two-volume Legislative 
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, and the 
congressmen generally seemed to not understand what a CPA could contribute. Rep. 
Phil Landrum, for example, opined: “I am wondering, perhaps, if the reporting and 
disclosure provision…are [sic] not going to be complete whether or not a certified public 
accountant performs the task.  I think the information called for is so completely set out 
in detail that it will not make a great deal of difference whether it is a certified public 
accountant or whether it is just who can add and subtract who puts it down there,” 
(United States Congress,1959a, p.983). 
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Whatever confidence the profession had engendered was surely not helped by the 
story of the United Textile Workers of America, a union with 50,000 members and 
approximately $900,000 in annual member dues in the 1950s (U.S. Congress, 1957b, 
p.3334).  In testimony before the McClellan Committee, widely reported in the press, 
detailed and often pointed questioning by committee counsel Robert Kennedy elicited a 
sorry tale of the President of the UTW spending tens of thousands of dollars of union 
funds on personal expenses, including $11,411 for theater tickets, over a period of 
several years (See particularly NYT 7/20/57, p.7).   Throughout this time, the UTW had 
employed a CPA, Eric Jansson, who had annually audited the union books, presumably 
with the understanding that he would not ask too many questions. (To document $13,000 
in “organizational expenses”, Jansson prepared a report listing the money as being used 
for the “Canadian situation” (U.S. Congress, 1957b, p.3325).  Besides McClellan, the 
senators present for this testimony included John Kennedy, who would become a leading 
figure in the Senate on labor reform legislation and had as large a role as any 
congressman in the final bill. Use of the term “certified public accountant” occurred with 
mortifying frequency. At one point, Senator Barry Goldwater asks Jansson: 
Senator Goldwater: Have you ever made recommendations to the president or the 
secretary-treasurer that they tighten up their constitution in relationship to money?  
Mr. Jansson: No, sir. 
Senator Goldwater: Let me ask you this: is that not an ordinary function of a 
certified public accountant?  (U.S. Congress, 1957b, p.3331). 
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It would not be surprising if the senators concluded that involving CPAs would 
be of little help in trying to clean up the unions.   
The final legislation, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
signed into law by President Eisenhower on September 14, 1959 and also known as the 
Landrum-Griffin Act after its two co-sponsors, did not include an audit requirement.  
The papers of President Eisenhower’s Labor Secretary, James Mitchell, suggest that cost 
was the chief concern.  The two congressmen who had proposed an audit requirement, 
Senator William Knowland (R-Ca) and Rep. Graham Barden (D-NC), were considered 
anti-labor and their proposals were characterized generally by Mitchell as being too 
harsh.  Eisenhower himself told Mitchell he did not want the legislation to be harder on 
labor than the government was on management.  Mitchell responded by briefly 
mentioning the SEC’s authority over corporations, though he does not seem to have had 
in mind an analogy between the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, which required 
annual audits of all publicly traded companies by independent accountants, and the 
proposed labor legislation.  In fact, in the only direct reference in Mitchell’s papers to 
the audit requirement, an aide writes Mitchell that it would “set a precedent which might 
be embarrassing in other cases,” apparently unaware of the Securities Acts.  Finally, the 
aide concludes that simply filing unaudited financial statements with the Department of 
Labor would be as effective as an independent audit (Mitchell Papers Box 107 (1958), 
B173 (1958), B177 (1959), B180 (1958); DDE Papers as President, Leg. Mtg Series, 
Box3). 
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II. The Impact of Landrum-Griffin 
Had the union audit requirement succeeded, a real possibility in the summer of 
1959 despite the profession’s ineffectual efforts, accountants would have found themselves 
with tens of thousands of new audit clients.  A similar result would have come from an 
audit requirement in the Welfare and Pension bill of the previous year (Wise, 1960, p.158). 
No doubt the potential impact of these bills on unions and pensions was in part what 
motivated the AICPA to involve itself in the debate, but the haplessness of their efforts 
suggests they had made no real provision to prepare for the massive potential new business 
of unions and pensions.    
Besides the potential impact of these bills on the accounting profession, both 
unions and pensions could have benefited tremendously from independent audits.  
Unions, in fact, are arguably still in need of the profession’s skills. There remains today 
no requirement that unions undergo outside audits.  As of 2000, only 63% of active 
unions with annual receipts in excess of $200,000 received audits by outside accountants 
(http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm#1).  A 2002 report by the 
House Committee on Education and the Workforce concluded: “The Department of 
Labor under both Republican and Democrat administrations has been very lax in its 
enforcement of the existing reporting regulations,” (U.S. Congress, 2002, p.6).  
It would be sixteen years before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974 required annual audits of pension plans by independent accountants.  
In 1956, a Senate committee found that “a great many of these plans are sorely lacking 
in adequate accounting procedures…It is the exception when welfare and pension 
programs provide for an accounting to or an audit on behalf of the beneficiaries,” (U.S. 
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Congress, 1956, p.6).  A 1972 Congressional study found that only 48% of all pension 
plans in their sample had independent audits.  The study was a statistical sample of plans 
reporting to the Department of Labor.  Of this sample, 91% of plans had fewer than 
1,000 participants; of these, 46% had independent audits.  It is also worth noting that 
93% of the plans in their sample had assets totaling at least 25% of accrued benefits 
(U.S. Congress, 1972, p.29).  Of course, the reforms of both unions and pensions 
involved not only financial statement audits but legal efforts and regulations put in place 
over decades, processes detailed by several historians (See Bellace and Berkowitz 1979, 
Estey et al. 1964, and  McLaughlin and Schoomaker, 1979).  This paper does not claim 
to judge the effectiveness of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Act, or ERISA.  For accounting historians’ purposes, it is the AICPA’s decision to 
involve itself in the debate that is of interest. 
The AICPA continued to become more assertive in its appearances before 
Congress.  By 1962, the AICPA’s attitude towards active lobbying had undergone a 
virtual transformation.    Many authors have documented the profession’s increasing 
involvement at this time in providing consulting services for audit clients.   At a hearing 
on the needs of small business, Robert Witschey, nominee for president of the AICPA, 
promotes the CPA as business advisor: “The traditional functions of the certified public 
accountant have been the independent auditing of financial statements leading to the 
expression of an opinion as to their fairness, and consultation on tax problems.  After 
World War II, however, it became apparent that one of the most important needs of 
small-business management was assistance in areas where the training and experience of 
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CPA’s gave them special skills.” Witschey further relates a study that found CPA’s are 
the most sought-after outside consultants among small business manufacturers (U.S. 
Congress, 1962, p.113-4). Gone are Carman Blough’s qualifiers about the AICPA not 
wanting to appear self-serving. 
The AICPA made a determined effort in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s to 
expand the profession’s numbers and business, and to take a more prominent place in 
American society.  At the time, it probably considered its previous, diffident stance to be 
naïve and antiquated in an expanding economy.  Though they did not secure audit 
requirements for unions or pensions, failures with very significant repercussions, they 
would get better at making their case in Washington.  Over the course of the 1960’s  
they would begin reaping the benefits of their fledgling effort in the union scandals, as 
CPAs secured recognition to practice before the Treasury Department on tax matters in 
1965  and federal government agencies increasingly hired CPAs (Carey 1970, p.257, 
437). More consequential was the profession’s abandoning the image it had so carefully 
cultivated since the New Deal.  The auditor who quietly but faithfully served the small 
investor, who “let in the light”, in FDR’s phrase, on the nation’s big businesses, gave 
way to the man of business eagerly promoting his expertise and the countless ways it 
could be utilized. Public accountancy had decisively turned towards becoming an 
interested profession.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the coming decades, the AICPA’s focus on the interests of small 
practitioners would contribute to a void in leadership for the profession. The Big 8 firms 
(who later merged into the Big 6, and, eventually, the Big 4), increasingly isolated from 
the Institute, began taking fewer public stances on controversial accounting issues, in 
part out of fear of losing important clients in an increasingly competitive market for 
accounting services (Zeff, 2003a, p.200). The corporate merger wave of the 1960’s put 
accounting standards regarding consolidations in the spotlight, and gave corporations a 
new interest in pressing their auditors for favorable treatment (Chatov, 1975, pp.199-
207).  Ray Ball, the most influential accounting researchers of the past half century, 
recently concluded:  “Anecdotal evidence suggests that over time auditors have drifted 
away from a skeptical, adversarial interaction with clients toward a cooperative 
approach” (Ball, 2009, p.284).     For their part, the AICPA continued to advocate for its 
membership.  The Institute’s first tentative steps at lobbying Congress during the union 
corruption scandals led to the development of a well-funded and largely successful 
presence in Washington (Coffee, 2006,  pp. 216-7).   
The growing market for consulting services helped fuel the profession’s 
aggressive new outlook.  A business model dependent on audit and tax services became 
less tenable as accounting firms pursued new clients through price competition.  
Financial statement audits, a traditionally low-margin business, began to take a back seat 
to more lucrative consulting work (Zeff, 2003b, p.269).  With the decline in value of the 
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profession’s flagship service and a more competitive ethic permeating public 
accountancy, public criticism from a newly interested press and from Congress became 
the norm beginning in the late 1960’s.  One accounting historian concluded: “By 1980, a 
deterioration in professional values appears to have set in” (Zeff, 2003b, p.267).  Zeff’s 
assessment is tame in comparison to that of a 1976 congressional report: “[We find] little 
evidence that [the Big Eight firms] serve the public or that they are independent in fact 
from the interests of their corporate clients” (U.S. Congress, 1976, p.4). Consulting work 
for audit clients continued to expand to the point where it dominated the business models 
of the Big 8 firms.  As George May had warned, the Institute had become an advocate 
for its members rather than an arbiter of accounting practice, and was unable to provide 
leadership on the complex accounting issues facing the big firms.   The ethical conflict 
of depending on consulting work from an audit client would not be addressed until the 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed by Congress in the wake of the Enron scandal, and 
characterized as “the most substantial increase in the regulation of U.S. public financial 
reporting in 75 years” (Ball, 2009, p.278).  
Enron also revealed the dubious relevance of accounting research, which was 
almost completely blindsided by the scandal, and even dismissive of repeated warnings 
from regulators in Congress and the SEC.   As late as 1999, a respected audit researcher 
huffed:  “[The SEC] questions whether the public will mistrust financial reporting when 
CPAs also collect substantial fees for their other assurance and consulting services 
rendered to audit clients.  While frequently expressed by regulators, there is remarkably 
little evidence that investors are concerned about such services” (Kinney, 1999, p.73).  
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As noted in Chapter I, prior to the Enron scandal accounting research had found no 
evidence that providing audit and consulting services for the same client hinders 
transparent financial reporting (Kinney et al., 2004, p.563).  Even in several studies 
since, research has been unable to provide a clear link, and in fact the prevailing 
hypothesis continues to be that consulting work actually improves the quality of the 
audit, by providing the auditor with additional expertise on the client’s business (Ball, 
2009, p.296; Kornish and Levine, 2004, p.173). 
The inability of mainstream accounting research to predict or even 
retrospectively explain Enron presents an opportunity for the reemergence of accounting 
history research in the U.S.  While a vibrant field abroad, accounting history has for 
several years been on the decline in American accounting research.  As Fleishman and 
Radcliffe (2005) write: “The field’s prospects in the U.S. seem to be diverging from the 
promising conditions seen in much of the rest of the world…even at American 
institutions whose leading faculty are accounting historians, it has long been very 
difficult to secure doctoral training in which accounting history would be the core of 
scholarship.”  They conclude that we may be witnessing “the quiet but discernable death 
of accounting history in the U.S.” (Fleishman and Radcliffe, 2005, pp.83-6). 
An often uncertain agenda may in part explain the field’s decline in the U.S.  
Over the past two decades, accounting history research has dealt with its own unique 
iteration of the postmodernist debate familiar to historians.  An attempt to incorporate 
“less visible participants in the accounting function itself” and to explore “the partisan 
nature of accounting records and methodologies through which accounting practices can 
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be deployed to suppress classes of people” has divided accounting historians into 
postmodernist and “traditional” camps (Fleishman and Radcliffe, 2005, pp.68,73).  
Traditionalists, also termed “neoclassical”, tend to follow a Whig history of “how 
accounting innovation has led to the economic betterment of a business entity”, and how 
the sophistication and professional standing of accounting has grown alongside an 
industrial economy (Fleishman and Radcliffe, 2005, p.71).  While postmodern studies 
have arguably led to a resurgence of a more normative stance regarding the effects of 
accounting practice beyond the narrow constituency of investors, its potential may be 
limited.  The postmodernist insight that accounting information may be used as a tool of 
hegemony by corporate managers does not necessarily alter the basic storyline of 
accounting aiding in the efficient functioning of a business.  Further, the studies that 
have been done of traditionally marginalized groups in accounting have been of limited 
value.  An excellent example is Wootton and Kemmerer’s (2000) study of the 
experience of women in the American profession.  The hiring of women in large 
numbers by accounting firms, a process that began in World War II and developed 
slowly over the next thirty-some years did not alter the profession in any discernable 
way.  The constituencies served by accounting information have remained unchanged 
since stockholders displaced banks in the early part of the 20th century as the primary 
audience for financial statements.    
My own study cannot be said to have benefited from a postmodernist 
perspective, although I would also question whether it can be classified as Whig history.  
While I do describe the changes that the accounting profession experienced in the mid-
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twentieth century as an evolution, these changes had both good and bad consequences.  
The democratization of the profession led to a broader understanding by the national 
leadership of the obligations of CPA’s in the American economy, as evidenced by their 
willingness to take on new responsibilities, and new legal liability, in the union 
corruption scandal.  But it also started the profession down the road of the CPA as a 
“man of business”, an advisor whose expertise could expand beyond the audit function 
into consulting.  As we have seen, this would compromise the CPA’s vaunted 
independence from management, the ideal that the New Dealers had worked so hard to 
instill in the profession. 
The profession’s troubled history in the half century since the union corruption 
scandals suggests that professional self-regulation leads to advocacy more than 
regulation.  Competing for business inevitably leads to the marginalization of ethical 
responsibilities.  This has proven true of the American legal profession as well as 
accounting, as corporate lawyers were replaced by in-house counsel and the 
“Brandeisian ideal” of the lawyer-statesman became an anachronism (Coffee, 2006, pp. 
199-202).  For accountants, the brief period emphasizing the societal responsibilities of 
the CPA ended almost as soon as it began.  Professionalizing the nation’s CPAs by 
bringing them all under one banner created an us-vs.-them mentality characterized by 
defensively protecting their professional turf, creating a profession that even accounting 
historians struggle to defend.  It may be that the fear that haunted the New Deal 
generation, of a government takeover of corporate auditing in the mold of federal health 
inspectors, is the only means of ensuring a disinterested profession.   
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